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ABSTRACT

Modem alliance theory is based on the assumption that states come together in
defense against a common threat. However, these theories were developed early in the
Cold War in an effort to explain how and why the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
was formed. Some member states do not fit into the neat theories suggested.
This thesis is an examination of the historical events that have shaped Greek
relations with NATO and the United States. The thesis seeks to assess the usefulness of
contemporary alliance theory in explaining divergent principles among alliance members
and the effect this has had on the Atlantic Alliance and alliances in general. It also seeks
to assess the influence of the US in Greek foreign policy from 1945 and the institution of
the Truman Doctrine. The failure of the US and NATO to react to overt moves by
Turkey against Greek sovereignty, the failure of the US and NATO to react to the
'Colonels' Coup,' or the Turkish invasion of Cyprus distanced Greeks from the common
policy promoted by the US and NATO.
Alliance theory is far from complete. The theories developed during the Cold
War lack fundamental concepts regarding intra-alliance relationships and cleavages that
develop among member states, such as the problems between Greece and Turkey. This
failure has hindered understanding of the true relationship between Greece and NATO to
be understood.
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CHAPTER!

INTRODUCTION

In the last forty years Greece's foreign policy landscape has undergone a
tremendous metamorphosis. Yet, some of the strategies Greek foreign policy makers
have used across different regime types remained strikingly similar. In 1970 the
country was under a dictatorship of military colonels. By 1990 Greece belonged to
the European Community and was generally considered among western Europe's
consolidated democratic regimes. In 1970 Greece was dominated by the influence of
the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's security concerns.
Neither the US nor NATO protested at the rise of a military government in Greece as
long as Greece maintained her commitments to the Alliance. The populace of Greece
elected a socialist-dominated government in the 1980's, more in protest against the lack
of support that these two had shown Greece during the years of the junta. For most of
the l 980's this government followed a foreign policy that essentially reversed years of
traditional Greek security policy. By the end of the Cold War, though, Greece had
ended the radical foreign policies of the eighties in favor of a pro-Europe/pro-Greek
foreign policy.
Traditional theories of alliance cohesion and disintegration concentrate on the
factors that hold security communities together in pursuit of a common goal. Nations
enter into alliances for security, stability and status. They remain together in pursuit
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of a common goal that is mapped out by this ideology by taking events of long past
and recent memory and forming them into a future goal (Liska 1962, 61 ). Regardless
of this esoteric explanation of ideological commitment among the members of this
alliance, one thing remains firm: states come together for common defense from a
perceived threat.
This basis of alliance cohesion can be considered the mainstream in alliance
theory today. Lacking in the discussion of security alliances is the development of
competing security policies among alliance member states, or more succinctly, what
happens when two alliance members feel the other is a greater threat to security;
perhaps even greater than the one they supposedly share together? What does the
alliance do? Does it take sides at risk oflosing a member? If the two members
initiate conflict, how does the collective security arrangement deal with the conflict?
Are the current theories that are concerned with alliance cohesion and dynamics
adequate to answer these questions at all?
In the decades of NATO's existence, the Southern, Mediterranean Flank of the

Alliance has been the least studied yet one of the most volatile and threatening to
the organization's stability. With the main threat of the Cold War being situated in
the Central European Theater, it is not a surprise to see that Greece has been
relegated to the periphery. It is a consequence of geo-strategic politics. The NATO
Alliance prioritized its perceived threat and consequently relegated what was
considered an independent Greek security problem to a tertiary frame. However,
Greece's concurrent security threat is another Alliance member.
The constant tensions between Greece and Turkey have threatened the
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alliance's stability and cohesion a number of times throughout its history. The Greek
perception has been that NATO, and consequently the United States, has seen Turkey
as a greater and more important ally in the Cold War, and they feel they have suffered
from this prioritization against them in their concurrent conflict with Turkey and with
the Cyprus issue.
The lack of extensive research on the Southern Flank necessitates a
reappraisal of the Greek-NATO relationship. What is needed is: 1) an evaluation of
the strategic threat to Greece by the Warsaw Pact in the Cold War years and the
simultaneous conflict with Turkey, 2) an evaluation of NATO and American policy
toward Greece and Turkey during times of increased tension including the most recent in
January/February 1996, 3) a re-evaluation of the evolution of Greek foreign policy
and, 4) attention to the divergence of threat priorities between Greece and NATO from
the period of accession to the present.
The reality of the Greek-NATO relationship was one of bilateral ties between
the US and Greece. Greece did not suffer from a direct Warsaw Pact threat on the
scale seen in the Central European Theater. In addition, it was not influential enough
in the Middle East. This has led the US and NATO to conclude that the greater
support go to Turkey, especially now with Turkey's ongoing internal difficulties and
rising influence of Muslim fundamentalism in the Turkish political system.
Legitimate Greek claims, including territorial and air space disputes in the Aegean,
and the ongoing Cyprus problem have been bypassed in support of Turkey due to
perceived threats to the strategic security of NATO and the US.
Greek foreign policy has been relatively consistent in the two decades since
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the Turkish invasion of northern Cyprus. It perceived Turkey as a greater threat to its
security than that of the Warsaw Pact. Post-Cold War Greek foreign policy has not
rectified the problems between the Greeks and Europeans. The cultivation of continued
relations with the government of Serbia and the refusal to recognize the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia have set Greek-European relations back years. Yet these are long
standing relationships and difficulties not recognized or accepted by the rest of Europe.
The lack of any European initiatives to recognize Greek claims against the Turks has also
led to Greek intransigence concerning common European or NATO policies.
Unfortunately for Greece, the 1980's saw the worst period of relations with
Europe and the US. The Government of Andreas Papandreou, under the guise of the
Pan Hellenic Socialist Party (PASOK), attempted to cultivate ties with the Communist
states of Eastern Europe and at many times were at odds with mainstream West
European foreign policies. In addition, Papandreou became associated with many socalled pariah states and statesmen, including Muamar Gadhafi and Manuel Noriega. He
also provided verbal support for the Jarulzelski Government in Poland and would not
condemn the Soviet downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 in 1980. Not surprisingly,
these positions did nothing to endear Greece to American and European favor.
One parallel that we may draw from this is perhaps that of the French foreign
policies from the 1950's onward President de Gaulle attempted to place French
policy in a position of independence, much the same as Papandreou attempted in the
1980's in Greece. Such was the inclination between France and Greece that
Papandreou and Francois Mitterand were in fact close friends, a relationship
cultivated in their mutual attempts to distance their states from perceived American
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dominance in Europe. However, Greece's small size, relative lack of status and
minor, independent military power did not provide it with the position and status
Papandreou had hoped. Rather, Papandreou followed the French lead in developing
an anti-, or perhaps non-American European coalition with France instead.
Returning to our opening questions then, what effect has this had on the
divergence of Greek and NATO policies? From the Greek view, it seems certain that
NATO was taking sides with Turkey in the Greco-Turkish bilateral disputes, and, as
such, NATO did not aid Greece in the event of a crisis. The best example of this is
the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. The weak NATO stance led to the
Karamanlis Government withdrawing Greece form NATO's military wing for a
number of years.
Greece was also extremely disconcerted at the prima facie support that the
United States and NATO had given the military government of General Papagos from
1967-1974. The military government's involvement in the Cyprus War could have
been averted, in Greek eyes, by stronger American and NATO pressure to end the
junta.
The American-NATO view of Greece was one of a radical, populist foreign
policy being pursued by Andreas Papandreou in an attempt to lessen AmericanNATO influence. At the same time, the Greeks were distanced from much of the
world community because of some of the political cultivations they pursued. During
the heightened tensions of the Cold War in the 1980's, NATO and American strategy
necessitated a stronger Turkey as well. Such support for increasing and modernizing
the Turkish military was also a direct threat to Greek national security. However, in
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the interests and purposes of the Alliance, it became NATO first, and hence Turkey,
and Greek national security concerning Turkey second.

Theory and Literature Review
In the literature on the formation and maintenance of the pluralistic security

community, we can see that some of the primary conditions necessary for such a
community were, and perhaps still are, violated in the case of Greece and NATO. One of
the main architects of collective security theory is George F. Liska. His theories evolved
from an analysis of state alignment. In his view states align for varying reasons.
However, it is in the dynamics of the alliance and pluralistic communities in the
maintenance of such broad-based coalitions that Liska readily admits that there exist
limits of interdependence among states.
Alliances are formed to enable their members to achieve a shared objective in
addition to joining for security, stability, and status (Liska 1962, 61). The leaders of
the member states must also weigh the costs and rewards of alignment. Therefore the
perception must exist that entrance into or remaining in an alliance must outweigh
other considerations, including retaining the total independence non-membership can
provide (Liska 1962, 175).
Alliances also must have a common rationalization. This ideology is a
primary cohesive bond that keeps the states bound together (Liska 1962, 61 ). In
many cases national priorities must take second place for the greater good of the
alliance. The decade after World War II saw the development of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization as a bulwark against the new threat of Communism. The Berlin
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Airlift, the Greek Civil War, the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, and the Korean
War all provided evidence to many western European states that only by presenting a
united front could they defend themselves from possible attack. The deterrence
capability of such an alliance far outweighed any other disadvantages it may have
brought about.
Alliance cohesiveness is related to the existence of a central, or 'core power.'
NATO's core power has always been the United States, and it is with the US that
alignment occurs in regard to NATO members. An increase in the relative power and
influence of the 'core' also tends to increase alliance cohesion and efficiency
(Daugherty and Pfaltzgraff 1971, 304). The dominance of the US in NATO cohesion
goes a long way in explaining Greek-NATO relations. It is the dominance of the USGreek bilateral relationship over Greek membership in NATO that has solidified
Greece into the European security regime. By dominating Greek security policy
separately as opposed to having the Alliance dominate it, the US gained concessions
from Greece that could not be acquired from the collective. This included US bases
that could be used for NATO or for separate US policy.
The end of the Cold War further emphasizes the problems of contemporary
alliance theory. Collective, pluralistic security communities generally disband after
their objectives have been achieved. That is where NATO stands now in the postCold War era. While we must assume that the current members must find some
positive sum gain in the Alliance continuing if it is not based on a perceived, unifying
threat. In the case of Greece, which has not conceded to the common threat of
NATO since 1974, the Cold War ended earlier than NATO collectively. Greek
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divergence from the common NATO policy can also be dated from the invasion of
Cyprus by Turkey, another NATO member, and the years immediately after. Greece
has remained in NATO, though, and her position has been analogous to the NATO
members that must deal with the Alliance in the post-Cold War now.
Despite the advances Liska's theory provides us with regarding the dynamics
of alliances, he is unable to take account of the special considerations regarding the
small state. It is with the small state that this thesis is most concerned Often they are
relegated to the periphery due to geo-strategic concerns or super-power priorities.
Christopher Bladen provides a significant contribution to Cold War alliance theory. He
points out that cleavages among the members cannot always be healed. While this may
be a general indication of the possible dissolution of the alliance it also provides
evidence that there is a limit to alliance action. It is generally confined to defense against
a specific common external threat (Bladen 1970, 125).
Bladen's specifications on alliance theory provide the succinct statement that
intra-alliance politics can conflict with alliance policy. This is what can be termed
the 'diversity of interests' argument. Bladen ponders that, logically, nation-states of
course have individual priorities in addition to the common alliance priority.
Generally, though, and parallel with the theory postulated by Liska, individual policy
does not conflict with or affect the common policy of the alliance.
One additional theorist on the dynamics of alliances is Robert L. Rothstein.
Rothstein's theories concentrate on the relationship between small states and their
foreign policies and their relationship with super-powers. This is especially useful in
the relationship of Liska's 'core' state which dominates the alliance system and the
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smaller states. Rothstein argues that small states can be pressured into membership
or perceive threats that, at the proper time, will make them more amenable to 'advice'
from the larger power (1970, 354).
The theoretical distinction between a great-power/small-power relationship
and a multilateral alliance is still valid, but, Rothstein argues, in actual practice it has
been severely diluted. The form of the alliance is based on the 'core' power's
influence. Generally, the initiator of the alliance tends to promote a multilateral
relationship in an effort to decrease the political losses alignment may bring about. It
is the small power that generally prefers the bilateral relationship. This form, in favor
of the small state, guarantees more aid, financial and material. The multilateral form
also favors the small state in providing it with more intra-alliance leverage and the
opportunities to present its views more regularly before other members of the alliance
(Rothstein 1970, 354-355).
There is a comparative lack of academic study on modem Greek foreign
policy in the United States, and very little on Greece and NATO specifically. The
majority of researchers in the area are American trained but teaching in Greece or
Europe, while the majority of English writers are in Great Britain. There is one
notable American exception, Keith Legg's Politics in Modem Greece; unfortunately, even
this book on contemporary Greek politics was written in 1969.
This is not to say that there are no researchers in the area. Many notable
Greek academics, such as Nikolaos Stavrou at Howard, Van Coufoudakis at Indiana
University-Purdue University-Fort Wayne, Christos Ioannides, director of the Speros
Basil Vryonis Center for the Study of Hellenism, and Theodore Coulournbis at the
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University of Athens have contributed much, in English and Greek, on Greek
security, politics, and foreign policy. However, most of their writings have centered
on Greek socialist foreign policy from the 1980's. While the goal of this paper is to
investigate these areas as well, the Greek relationship with NATO presents a unique
example of internal problems in collective security organizations. How does a state
with conflicting security policies deal with these issues? How did this divergence of
priorities develop? How does the organization deal with this state's problem
collectively?
Excellent information on modem Greek foreign policy is available from the
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy whose annual yearbook on
South-East Europe provides many useful articles from Greek academics and
professionals in Greek foreign policy and security. A recent interview with a member
of the Greek Mission to NATO, Ms. Voula Panagiotithou, has provided 'official'
confirmation of many of conclusions reached by researchers on Greek foreign policy.
Journals that deal with the Greek defense policy, and provide evidence of the
Greek perception of its true enemy, include (in Greek) "Amyna kai Diplomatia
(Hellenic Diplomacy and Defence)," "Amyntika Themata (Greek Defence News),"
and "Syngkronos Stratos (Modem Army)." In addition, the London based 'Economist'
magazine has been utilized for recent political developments. It provides a unique
coverage of Greece's domestic politics and international relations, much better than any
American newspapers.
The thesis, then, will illustrate how and why Greek foreign policy has
developed and how, given the current application of alliance theory dynamics, their
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security policy has developed so differently from that of the NATO Alliance. By
assessing the relationships that have dominated Greek foreign policy from
independence to the present and the security threats that she has perceived, the study
will analyze the expectations of the various Greek governments and the reactions of
her allies. It will also consider whether the alliance theories analyzed and used as a
basis for the discussion here are relevant in analyzing the relationship of NATO and
Greece.
Four distinct periods of Greek foreign policy can be discerned. Chapter Two
presents the historical development of Greek foreign relations based on her
relationship with the power that dominates the Mediterranean. From independence
until the end of World War II this was the United Kingdom. Developments after
World War II brought about the United States as the dominant power in the eastern
Mediterranean and changed the security relationship for Greece. Chapter Three
examines the development of the military coup in Greece and their relationship with
the US and NATO from 1967 to 1974. It also focuses on the role of the Cypriot War
with Turkey and the lack of involvement by the US and NATO. Chapter Four
analyzes the immediate post-military government events in Greek policy and how
they contributed to the election of the Socialist government of Andreas Papandreou in
1981. It goes on to explain how Papandreou dominated and changed Greek foreign
policy in an attempt to distance Greece from the influence of the US and NATO. The
following chapter will then chronologize developments of Greece in the postPapandreou/post-Cold War era and the dominance of the Turkish threat in Greek national
security concerns.
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CHAPTER2
GREEK SECURITY POLICY: 1821 - 1967

The role of Greece in the cooperative security arena known as the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization has changed through various eras of the Greek state.
Since Greek independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1821, Greece has had a long
association with great powers that have served as her sponsor and protector. Initially
it was Great Britain. With liberation from German occupation in 1944, Greece
became even more concerned with its security posture, both internal and external. It
was fighting a Communist guerrilla army that had the power to win, and was
becoming surrounded by Communist powers on its northern borders in Albania,
Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. Fortunately, relations with Italy slowly mended and those
with Turkey remained relatively stable until the 1960's.
At the end of World War II, Great Britain was no longer able to continue
supporting the Greek Kingdom. This led to the United States stepping in as the new
power behind, not only Greece, but also Turkey and other European and
Mediterranean states. Facing an ever belligerent Communist Europe, led by the
Soviet Union, it was the entrance of the United States into the region that promoted
Greek security and accession to the new security alliance being formed in Europe. It
also reflected a lack of Greek independence in foreign policy which plagued the
nation from independence and for decades to come.
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The pages that follow will outline these developments by placing into
perspective for the reader the outside influences that pressured the new Greek state
for over a century and a half. These influences forced Greece into a subservient
position to the greater players in world politics. This position as a close, yet
subservient ally to the greater powers forced Greece to view threats to the larger
allies as her own.
This chapter will also present the formative events that began to weaken the
cohesion of the Southern Flank of the Atlantic Alliance. When, in the late 1950's and
1960's Greece began to see its security threatened by a so-called ally, Turkey, its
security position began to alter away from that of the NATO allies and more towards
an independent one. The development of an independent threat, a threat that soon
began to take priority over the collective Alliance security threat, a threat from
another NATO ally, was to become a major problem in maintaining the cohesiveness
of NATO's Mediterranean members.

Great Power Intervention
As one of the main states responsible for Greece's independence from the
Ottoman Empire, Great Britain was able to maintain an era of influence over the new
state that lasted for over 120 years. At the end of the 19th-century, the post-Napoleonic
period, Great Britain, France and Russia had begun to consider the future of the southern
Balkans. In reality, the question was not one of Greek independence. Few doubted that a
Greek nation existed any longer. The true question was who would annex the area or
whether it would return to the salvaged Ottoman Empire (Woodhouse 1991, 124 ).
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Greek nationalists began appealing to the United States and Great Britain in
early April 1821 after full fledged fighting broke out against the Ottomans. The
Greeks were offering the Greek Kingdom to minor nobility throughout Europe,
optimistically sure of their independence. The Great Powers had their own notions of
the future monarch of the Kingdom of Greece, however. The recognition of this by
the Great Powers was enough to ensure their eventual involvement in Greek
independence and their choice of the Greek monarch (Woodhouse 1991, 138).
The Great Powers' involvement in the Greek independence movement was
not without urging from the private sector. The rise of Philhellene, or pro-Greek,
independence movements throughout Europe, especially in London, Paris, and St.
Petersburg provided a romantic notion to many young adventurers of freeing the
cradle of democracy and Western thought and ideals from the Ottoman Empire. The
ultimate private adventurer was Lord Byron who arrived in Greece in April 1824, four
years into the struggle (Woodhouse 1991, 141).
The French, British and Russians all rebuffed alternate attempts to seek an
end to the fighting with some autonomy or independence for the Greeks. Each
secretly suspected the other of maneuvering for dominance over the region. Of
course this was entirely true. The various Greek parties that supported the French,
British or Russians were also arguing with each other. However, by 1825-26 they
were so strapped for aid that they jointly solicited support from anywhere. It was the
British group that was noticeably gaining influence by this point (Woodhouse 1991,
143).
The rise in violence and anarchy in south-east Europe finally prompted the
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Powers into direct intervention. The Sultan in Istanbul knew that he could no longer
pacify the area and this ultimately led to the creation of the new Greek Kingdom that
was finalized in April 1832 with the Great Powers' choice of Otto, the seventeen-year
old son of King Ludwig I of Bavaria. Thus the Great Powers had not only guaranteed
Greek independence and sovereignty, but they also proceeded to decide on her
boundaries (see map in Appendix A). While certainly not sovereign in any real sense,
after all Greece was under Bavarian regency and subject to arbitrary interference by
Great Britain or France (the Russians having signed a treaty with the Sultan earlier
and withdrawn from the region), they at least had their country (Woodhouse 1991,
155-156).
The Greeks were obviously not entirely happy with the results. They still
wanted for more territory that were 'ancestral lands' and were displeased by the
choice of Otto due to his Catholic origins when the Greeks had time and again
requested an Orthodox monarch. However, the only place such a monarch could
come from was Russia, and the powers had agreed not to have one of their family
members on the throne (Woodhouse 1991, 161-162). Yet again the Great Powers had
decided that the Greek interests were of secondary importance.
For the next one-hundred years, Greece would continue to be dominated by
the greater powers that dominated Europe, the most influence being exhibited by
Great Britain. Thus, what could be termed the British Century in Greece was born.
Not only was this because of the influence that Great Britain had over Greece in their
support against the Ottoman Empire, but it was also tied to various Greek policies
that went out of line away from British interests. British power in the Mediterranean
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also provided direct evidence to the continuing Greek governments that Great Britain
was also the only power that Greece could turn to for real support if and when it was
needed.
The fall of the Bavarian dynasty from the Greek monarchy was followed by a
Greek plebiscite to invite Prince Alfred of Great Britain to be the King of the
Hellenes. The British nixed this quickly and, with the other powers, invited Prince
William George, the second son of the King of Denmark. Unlike the previous King,
William George received the overwhelming support of the Greeks(Woodhouse 1991,
170). This provided much needed stability in the Greek political system since it was
the first time in the new nation that the people had made a decision that was not
changed or imposed by the outside. The fact that the new King George I was King of
the Hellenes, meaning all Greeks, as opposed to just the King of Greece, like King
Otto, was especially important later when the Greeks began to expand to encompass
Greeks lands still under British and Ottoman control (Woodhouse 1991, 171 ).
As the Greeks began to expand under the nationalistic notion called the
Megali Idea, or Great Idea, they constantly faced intervention by the Great Powers
that wished to maintain the integrity of the diminishing Ottoman empire in an effort
to balance power in the region. Russian Tsars had for years been pressing for the
dismantling of the Empire, and thus the British and the French were bound to keep
the Sultan's empire from falling to keep the Tsars in place.
The Greek Kingdom was constantly seeking enosis, or union, with the
occupied Greek lands to the north, islands in the Aegean, and most of all Crete.
Greece lost lands during the abortive military adventures in the late 19th century
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under Crown Prince Constantine. This was the only severe setback suffered by the
new King George I. The timing for this was a little ill-conceived on the Greek
government's part. A few years later would have seen the rise of ethnic nationalism
in the Ottoman Empire that saw the independence given to many former subject
peoples. Indeed, in 1908, the revolution of the Young Turks in Macedonia, in
reaction to a century of nationalism in the Ottoman provinces, provided Greece with
the first chance to become a pro-active player in the region as opposed to a reactive
plaything of the Great Powers (Woodhouse 1991, 182-183 ).
Under the leadership of Eleftherios Venizelos the Balkan League was formed
linking Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria in written and unwritten defense
agreements and to take advantage of the fast dissolving Ottoman Empire. Rather
than being forced to accept the Great Powers' plans, the Balkan League hoped to take
advantage of the spoils of the end of an empire on their own terms. From 1908 to
1912, Venizelos had prepared Greece for war by inviting military missions into the
country from France and Great Britain (Woodhouse 1991, 190).
Greece declared war on the Ottoman Empire on October 18, 1912, following
Montenegro, Serbia and Bulgaria. The Greek Government, under Venizelos,
announced enosis with Crete and captured Thessaloniki in November. The League
successes were so quick that the powers felt compelled to intervene. The British and
the French were unwilling to allow the Aegean islands around the Dardanelles to fall
into Greek hands, and the Russians were not willing to see the Ottoman Empire
collapse just yet. In addition, all three powers did not want to see Constantinople fall.
After two disastrous months, the Turks signed an armistice in December. Enver
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Pasha, however, leader of the Young Turks, overthrew the standing government, and
renewed the war. This ended in even worse terms for the Turks. The Greeks
captured Ioannina, the Bulgarians and Serbs captured Adrianople and the allies
captured the remaining Turkish forces in Albania and Macedonia by the end of May,
1913 (Woodhouse 1991, 191).
It was at this time that France and Great Britain were preoccupied with other

matters, namely, Italian and Austrian power in the Mediterranean and German power
in Central Europe. This was fully evident in the summer of 1914 when World War I
broke out. The new King, Constantine I, favored neutrality, while Prime Minister
Venizelos favored joining Germany in an effort to forestall any possible Bulgarian
advances into Greek Macedonia. However, the German Kaiser had already
positioned German policy in favor of Turkey and so informed his brother-in-law
Constantine (Woodhouse 1991, 195). The British and French could not commit
support to Greece either, although this changed later. Yet no support was possible
materially and Greece remained caught in a conundrum. Finally, the allies decided to
adhere to a Greek request to send troops to Thessaloniki when Bulgaria mobilized its
troops in September 1915. Lack of support and a late Greek mobilization could not
stem Bulgarian and Austrian forces from overrunning Serbia, whose remaining forces
retreated to Corfu, off the coast of northern Greece (Woodhouse 1991, 198).
By this time, the differences in policy between King Constantine and
Venizelos resulted in totally severed relations that the British and French, while
fearing civil war, felt could be useful in forcing the Greek King to back down
(Woodhouse 1991, 198-199). A violent incident between French naval forces in
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Athens and Piraeus forced the allies to recognize a provisional Venizelist
government, blockade Greece, and demand reparations from Constantine's
government (Woodhouse 1991, 201).
In an attempt to gain stability and reunite the government, Constantine
stepped down in favor of his son Alexander (yet not officially abdicating) in June
1917 and Venizelos continued as Prime Minister. By the spring of 1918, Greek
forces were readied and reunited with allied ones in northern Greece, and they
launched an offensive that drove enemy forces from Macedonia and entered Bulgaria
and Serbia. Bulgaria surrendered and a month later Turkey capitulated World War I
ended a month after that in November (Woodhouse 1991, 202-203).
Greece emerged from the Balkan Wars and World War I in a stronger position
than it had ever been. However, the Greeks and the Great Powers failed to recognize
the revival of Turkey under Kemal Ataturk and failed to ratify the Treaty of Sevres
(which in later years the Turks would use in their claims against Greece). As Kemal
began organizing his troops to finally rid Constantinople of the Sultan, who remained
in power because of the Great Powers, the Greek Government, still under Venizelos,
began to organize its forces to attack Ataturk's army in the interior of Anatolia.
Ataturk had made his new capital at Ankara, and this was the ultimate target for the
Greeks. The Greeks stuttered forward against the Turks until August 1921 when the
Turks finally achieved a major counter-attack and pushed the Greeks back
(Woodhouse 1991, 205-206).
The Greeks, yet again, had to turn to the Great Powers to finalize a peace
between the two. This was accomplished at Lausanne. While Greece lost most of
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her territorial gains made under the Treaty of Sevres, she became more homogenous
with the forced exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey. While at the
time certainly painful to all involved, it has benefited the Greeks. The Greeks also
lost their claims to the Dodecanese Islands, which remained in the hands of the
Italians, and also to Cyprus, which remained under British control (Woodhouse 1991,
207-209).
The appearance of the Italians on the scene in Greek affairs would have a
major effect on Greece's entry into World War II. It was also another example of
Greece's reliance on external support. In August 1923, an Italian official with the
commission settling boundary disputes between Greece and Albania was murdered
along with four members of his staff. Mussolini presented an impossible array of
demands, followed by a naval bombardment of the island of Corfu and its occupation
by Italian troops. Greece appealed to the League of Nations which favored Italy,
owing to Greek security negligence (Woodhouse 1991, 211 ). The Great Powers
congratulated themselves and Mussolini and Greece each learned something about
the international community.
Despite Greek attempts at pursuing an independent foreign policy during the
successive Balkan Wars, however, Greece had not yet achieved a true semblance of
independence in her foreign policy. During her disastrous invasion of Turkish
Anatolia she was forced to accept Great power dominated cease-fire terms at
Lausanne and was forced to surrender all her territorial gains. Later, Great Power
perception to appease the rising Mussolini forced Greece into a minority role under
the Great Power-dominated League of Nations. Yet again Greek foreign policy was
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subjugated to the benefit of the Great Powers' policies.

Great Britain As Protector

The inter-war period was dominated in Greece by Great Britain. Despite a
lack of support by Great Britain over the war in Anatolia and British pressure over the
Corfu Incident, Greece and Great Britain maintained amicable relations throughout
the inter-war period. This was out of practicality and necessity for the two. Greece
recognized her extended position in the Eastern Mediterranean and Britain
recognized the importance of having further support in the region to counterbalance
Italian strength (Legg 1969, 71 ). Greek politicians have nearly always been practical.
This is important in explaining the Metaxas regime's support for the British as
opposed to the Axis. Strategic necessities and Greece's small size would have put her
under the heel of Mussolini next door, as opposed to British involvement in Greek
foreign affairs from London. After all Great Britain was also still the strongest power
in the Mediterranean.
After Greece was overrun in World War II, the Greek Government in Exile,
led by Emmanuel Tsouderos and King George Il, still conducted policy to promote
the resumption of British preponderance in Greece after the war (Legg 1969, 71 ).
While the official Greek Government in Exile, a sovereign state under international
law, was operating in conjunction with the British and Allies, the Greek Communist
Party (KKE) was operating in conjunction with Soviet policy, a track they had
followed since the inter-war period. During the resistance and the post-war era this
would be a major problem and lead to the later civil war.
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One main point that allowed Britain to maintain so much influence over
wartime Greek policy was an Anglo-Greek agreement to place Greek government
military units under the authority of the British High Command. The units were to
maintain their national identity but be reorganized along British lines and equipped
with British equipment (Legg 1969, 72). This would be extremely important in
December 1944 when the Germans began to withdraw from Greece and the Civil
War would break out in its place. Thus the British were technically given a free hand
in dealing with Greek forces. This included the highly publicized events of the Greek
mutinies in Egypt and the Middle East, which the British quelled The power of the
British over Greek forces many times left the Greek government-in-exile in the dark.
Indeed British Intelligence activity and British support for the creation of guerrilla
armies provoked heated calls from the King and his government. The Greeks
ultimately blamed the British for creating armies that were dominated by the
Communists and hostile to the returning government in 1945 (Legg 1969, 72).
The British also took responsibility for dealing with the uprisings that
occurred at liberation in December 1944 and January 1945. The British were illinformed as to the polarization of Greece between different factions (Close 1995,
132), thus when the British returned with the Mountain Brigade (a Greek unit) it was
intended to form the nucleus of the new Greek Army. Unfortunately, the
Communists were quite sure that the first thing this army would do would be to come
after it. Indeed, liberation brought with it the openings for the Communists to lead a
war for dominance in the country. The British had some 30,000 troops, as opposed to
some 300,000 German, Italian, and Bulgarian troops during the occupation (Close
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1995, 136).
The British were also involved in the creation of the new Greek government.
The British leaned towards the "crowned republic" idea and the monarchy continued
reflecting pure British interests. In addition, there was little popular support for the
returning government, which by now was under the direction of Prime Minister
George Papandreou, and a plebiscite and election was organized. The lack of any
Greek individual or group power, other than the Communists, allowed the British to
again dominate in Greece.
The British General in command of the Anglo-Greek Forces, Ronald Scobie,
ordered the guerrilla forces to disband. With that, the Communists resigned from the
unity government of Prime Minister George Papandreou, and prepared to fight. In
the ensuing six weeks, Anglo-Greek Forces and ELAS (Communist) forces fought
over the capital of Athens until Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden arrived to
broker a truce, which they accomplished in January 1945.

Enter the United States
By 1947, Great Britain could no longer maintain the support necessary to aid
Greece financially and militarily. Fighting broke out again in 1946, bringing
reconstruction to a standstill. Assistance was desperately needed not only to rebuild
the war shattered economy but also to maintain Greece outside of the growing
Communist orbit. When the British government informed the United States that it no
longer could maintain its assistance, the United States finally entered Greek politics
in earnest.
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In January 1947 an American economic mission arrived in Greece to assess
the needs of the country. Two months later, on March 12th, the U.S. announced that
the Truman Doctrine would provide aid to Greece and Turkey in an effort to prevent
their passing under the control of the Soviet-sponsored Communist bloc. In addition,
it provided a firm foundation for the United States to establish itself as a power in
Europe, as well as Greece in particular.
Greece, however, still had to deal with the Communist guerrillas. Despite
massive influxes of American military and economic aid, the rebels remained active
and the central government was very unstable. Coalition governments collapsed one
after another. Successive governments attempted amnesty proposals, but to no avail.
By the end of 1948, the United States was deeply rooted in Greece, and, according to
Woodhouse, American military advisors came very close to combat in the mountains
(1991, 259).
The only bright spot for Greece was in 1948, when relations with Italy were
finally normalized. The Dodecanese Islands were returned to Greek control, an
agreement was reached on Italian reparations, and the Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation was signed between the two states. Within the country,
thanks to massive American aid, the Corinth Canal was reopened as were many
bridges and roads, but most were only available for military purposes (Woodhouse
1991, 259).
By the end of 1949, United States military aid to Greece amounted to over
$353.6 million and included 159,922 small arms weapons and 4,130 mortar and
artillery pieces (Close 1995, 214). The massive support being received from the
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United States was in stark contrast to the British support previously received Not
only was it a massive increase in pure economic terms, but the United States was
much more zealous and optimistic than the British in pursuing the fight against the
guerrillas (Close 1995, 214).
The Communists were finally broken in a nine-month whirlwind campaign
from December 1948 to August 1949. The offensive forced the Communists across
the borders into Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria. For whatever reason, the
Comintem Headquarters in Belgrade did not recognize the Greek Communist forces.
The Greek Communist leader Zachariades announced the end of large-scale
campaigns but that small operations would continue. This forced the Greek Army to
remain in the field in the North of Greece, but, for all intents and purposes, the Civil
War was over (Close 1995, 219).

The Range of American Influence
The Truman Doctrine linked security for the United States and Greece. With
the power and size of the United States behind it, Greece was very susceptible to
American "advice." According to Legg, the American aid program required
American approval of any Greek program receiving aid (1969, 73). Thus, since any
Greek program went through the use of foreign exchange, the Americans had a
dominating position in the Greek Government. It was assumed that American advice
would be taken seriously and followed. Therefore, American 'advisors' were attached
to Greek ministries (Legg 1969, 73).
The Greek military was also dominated by the United States. Military
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operations were conducted by a joint Greek-American General Staff and American
observers were assigned down to the divisional level. Greek forces were also totally
re-equipped with American material and goods and reorganized along American
lines. Indeed, as more than one writer has noted, decisions on weapons, organization
and promotions were made by the United States (Legg 1969, 73).
The chronic instability in the internal Greek political system enforced
American opinion of intervention into the Greek political society. Whenever a
development was suspected, or a disruption in the economy occurred, or any
instability within Greece arose, the United States intervened Elections in 1950 and
1951, according to Legg, were at American insistence as it searched for stability in
the Greek system. Despite this, the American Embassy regularly announced that it
did not subscribe to interference in domestic affairs of another nation (1969, 74).
The United States was also in the position to withhold aid when certain
policies it promoted were not followed by the Greeks. The problem was in the
collection of Greek coalitions that attempted to run the governments. Each policy
had its supporters and detractors. The coalitions so often forming Greek governments
were very unstable when veiled threats were received from the United States. These
pressures on the Greeks were exacerbated when one takes into account that the
internal pressures in the American and British political systems then reflected on their
Greek policies as well.
Greek foreign policy at the time was also securely attached to American and
British pressures. While Greece had received the Dodecanese after World War II, it
was only because the powers had agreed to it. Greek hopes towards Northern Epirus,
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Thrace, and Cyprus were thwarted by Great Power pressures. Advances in Thrace
were disallowed because of the friendship policy with Turkey. Advances into
northern Epirus were not supported by any powers. Lastly, Cyprus was maintained as
an open question because that was as far as any Greek government could get on the
topic. Even after Cyprus received her independence from Great Britain, the US and
Britain effectively shelved any further Greek action towards the island.
Greek security policy, while still moving towards some type of enosis, or
union, with the other ethnic Greek areas became overshadowed in May 1950 with the
outbreak of war in Korea. Greece immediately sent troops to support the United
Nations action there. The Soviet sponsored coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948, the
Berlin Blockade of the same year, and the fears of continued Communist agitation in
Greece pushed Greece and Turkey into the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization in
1951. These security fears about Central Europe were also now applied to the client
states of the peripheries in Northern and Southern Europe. Thus NATO and Greece
began their long and troubled relationship.

NATO's Origins and the Accession of Greece - 1951
The origins of collective security in Europe, as noted previously, were in
European and American responses to Soviet moves in the Mediterranean and Eastern
Europe in the immediate post-War era. Alfred Grosser, in The Western Alliance,
states that, "The official aim of NATO was a more rational organization of the joint
defense efforts, though it was equally important to create compulsory structures
which would entail the automatic participation of the United States in any response to
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an attack on Europe (1982, 87)." While ensuring American involvement, the
organization was also expanding to include Turkey and Greece, and later Germany.
The latter became the foundation of NATO security policy which centered around
Central Europe. Northern and Southern Europe ranked second and third respectively
in order of priorities.
NATO was just beginning to turn itself from a paper organization and begin a
process of militarization when Greece, along with Turkey, entered NATO in October
1951. The rate of militarization was rapid, with many states doubling previous
defense expenditures between 1948 and 1952. Total NATO spending leapt from $20
billion in 1950, to $40 billion in 1951, to $60 billion in 1952 (Kugler 1993, 59).
Included in this was the necessary support infrastructure necessary to establish
NATO's defense posture.

The Soviet Threat
The Soviet threat to Central Europe, at the beginning of 1952, was made up of
the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG), made up of six field armies, this
implying a formal wartime stance. The GSFG's 22 divisions in East Germany were
joined by 8 other Soviet divisions in other East European Communist states. They
had begun a massive modernization and training program that included updates in
command and control and logistical support and facilities. Updated tanks and the
introduction of jet fighters and bombers were also deployed to the tactical air forces

in Eastern Europe (Kugler 1993, 69-70).
At the same time, the Soviets were also attempting to update the forces in the
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other Eastern European states. In 1948 the Soviets had begun signing separate
mutual defense treaties with each of these nations. Armaments were sent to the states
in an effort to upgrade their armed forces. By early 1954, efforts were under way to
field some 65 to 80 East European divisions, half of which were to be maintained in
combat-ready status. Of these divisions, 30 were in Poland, East Germany, and
Czechoslovakia (Kugler 1993, 70).
At the same time, the Soviets were signaling that they were willing to
negotiate over the future developments in Europe, yet they were also conducting the
massive military re-armaments campaign and modernization. The Europeans were
feeling very vulnerable to the numbers they were facing. They knew that they could
not maintain the necessary forces without resorting to a wartime economy. The array
of forces in East Germany and the Soviet Union allowed for a surprise attack straight
from East Germany into Central Europe or a more gradual buildup with
reinforcements coming from the Soviet Union into East Europe.

The Accession of Greece and Turkey to NATO - October 1951
Most of the members of NATO were not ready to admit Greece and Turkey to
the Alliance in 1951. The expansion of already stretched security commitments
could only be taken up by the United States, which indeed may have been considered
before the Korean War as an extension of the Truman Doctrine. By May 1951 the
North Koreans had invaded South Korea and events overtook the members of NATO.
At the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in September of 1951 Greece and
Turkey were unanimously invited to accede to the charter, though Norway and the
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Netherlands still expressed reservations (Brown 1991, 4).
At the time, NATO military planners saw Korea as the opening Soviet gambit.
Perhaps to be followed by Soviet pressure on Turkey or Northern Greece. The
perceived threats thus outweighed fears of over extending their security commitments
to two states that have a history of animosity and little desire to resolve them. For
their part, Ankara and Athens regarded their accession to the Treaty as an extension
of their relations with the US. Both sides agreed, in principle, to refrain from
"stirring up" grievances (Brown 1991, 4-5). For its part, the United States adopted
George Kennan's policy of 'long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment' of
Moscow's expansionist policies (Bolles 1952, 15). The US officially declined to
warn the two states from raising issues that could cause difficulties with other
member states, as it did not wish to add any preconditions to their accession(Brown
1991,4).
Despite this planning and agreement that Greece and Turkey were vulnerable
to the Soviet onslaught, NATO planning did not reflect any real change in thinking
during the 1950's. A policy statement encoded MC 14/1 in 1951 was the first
combined NATO military strategy policy that, while relying heavily on nuclear
weapons, incorporated many defensive aspects for the entire Alliance, not just the
Central Region. Ninety divisions were called for (including reserves): 54 were for
the AFCENT (Allied Forces Central), defined as the area from Denmark through
West Germany and France, 14 divisions were for AFNORTH in Norway, l division
for Iceland, and 21 divisions were for AFSOUTH to protect Italy, Greece, and Turkey
(Kugler 1993, 60-61 ).
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As evidenced by pure numbers, what was ear-marked for the North and
Central forces far outweighed forces assigned to the South. Even then, one third of
the forces were in Italy, not the areas in Thrace where a Communist attack would
be. Even fewer troops were available for the Turks who bordered the Soviet Union.

Greek Security Policy 1952-1967

Greek security policy, then, should have been expected to change
fundamentally. Under NATO doctrine, Greece should have concentrated her armed
forces on the northern reaches in preparation for an impending Communist attack,
from Bulgaria or perhaps Yugoslavia. Yet, in reality, Greek security policy continued
to concentrate along the same track it always had. Greek forces remained along the
Turkish border in Thrace and equipped mainly for internal security, should a
Moscow-inspired Communist insurgency return.
NATO had no real contingency plans for reinforcing Greece should war break
out. American military bases that were established after Greece's accession to the
Alliance would support Greece, but this only confirms the thought that Greek
membership was merely an extension of her relationship with the United States.
Greece did participate in NATO planning and was generally on good terms with her
neighbor and Alliance compatriot Turkey until 1955. Even then, however, Greece
maintained her commitments to NATO.
Greece remained tied to the United States, and this was evident in the
continued presence the United States had in Greek affairs. The early l 950's saw the
new US Central Intelligence Agency establish its Greek equivalent, the Central
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Service of Information, or KYP in its Greek acronym (Woodhouse 1985, 6). This
would establish later, for most of the Greek populace anyway, that the US was
responsible for all Greek troubles and provide later Greek governments with a useful
scapegoat. One benefit of the increased US influence over the Greeks was the ability
of the US to shelve, for a while at any rate, any Greek pretensions for enosis with
Cyprus (Legg 1969, 75). Indeed it was only the United States' influence that
prevented NATO's Southern Flank from breaking into all out war between Greece
and Turkey, and possibly destroying the rest of the Alliance as well.
The problems in the Southern Flank stemmed from long standing animosities
between Turkey and Greece. However, in the immeditate post-World War II period,
relations between the two were fairly cordial. Greece and Turkey were both aware of
the threat that the Soviets presented to their borders and were quick to petition to join
the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1950 when the Korean War broke out.
After their accession to the Treaty, a new detente seemed to sweep over the Balkans.
In common with Marshal Tito's Yugoslavia, the three states signed an interlocking
political and defense alliance at Bled, Yugoslavia in August 1954. Needless to say,
the western allies looked on the event with considerable approval (Woodhouse 1991,
268-269).
However, changes in foreign policy following Josef Stalin's death ended the
need for the Balkan Pact as new Soviet policy sought cordial and normal relations
with the three states. However, divisions between Greece and Turkey were again
coming to the forefront, and the short period of cooperation was ending. Renewed
agitation over Cyprus would bring the two to the brink of all out war.
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Greek claims to Cyprus, justified or not, have been consistent since
independence. The British, however, were not prepared to hand the island over to the
Greeks or the Turks, who believed that the island should pass back to them when the
British gave up their claim. British claims were that Cyprus was never part of Greece
and that it was better off under British rule anyway. This may have been true, but it was
rude to say it so blatantly and wounded the Greeks deeply. More realistically, the British
were fearful of civil war between Greeks and Turks on the island, a possible major war
between the two states over the island, or perhaps even a Cypriot Communist take-over
(Woodhouse 1991, 270).
The Greeks were in no position to press the British for enosis nor did they
receive any support in Washington on the subject. The government in Athens was
actually embarrassed over the continuing campaign mounted on its behalf by various
groups. Greece was in no condition to absorb the island. Recovery from the war was
proceeding slowly, there were riots in Athens, and pressure from the national leader
of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, forced the government to look on the campaign for

enosis negatively (Woodhouse 1991, 271).
The Greek government felt obliged to take the Cyprus problem to the UN but
were rebuffed when Britain and other states voted it to be an internal problem of the
United Kingdom. This was exacerbated in April 1955 when a campaign for enosis
was launched with a series of attacks on British installations and property. Led by
Colonel George Grivas, the Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston-EOKA (National
Organization of Cypriot Combatants) began to violently oppose the continued British
rule on the island.

33

An attempt by the British to invite the Turks and Greeks to London to settle

the dispute was met by anti-Greek rioting in Istanbul and Smyrna on September 6,
1955. As a result, Greece withdrew from a number of allied and NATO training
exercises in the eastern Mediterranean (Woodhouse 1991, 272-273). The British
finally agreed to self-government of Cyprus if the Greeks and Turks could come up
with an agreement, however the two were deadlocked.
Nineteen-Fifty-Five saw the arrival of Constantine Karamanlis to the
premiership of Greece and the longest uninterrupted government in the history of the
modem Greek Kingdom. Karamanlis wanted to end the crisis over Cyprus and with
Turkey, but 1956 saw the eruption of the Suez Crisis, which strained an already bad
situation. The British lost any popularity they may have maintained, and Karamanlis
could not restrain the popular nationalism that was sweeping Greece in support of
Greek Cypriots. Colonel Grivas' campaign against the British turned against TurkishCypriots and 'unpatriotic' Greeks on the island (Woodhouse 1991, 275-276).
The Turks would not tolerate enosis at any cost, and preferred no change at
all, partition, or reversion of the island to Turkey itself. No one could agree on a
common policy within the respective governments or among them. Greece,
following the favorable reception Egypt recieved by the UN in its crisis over Suez,
sought to return the issue to the Security Council, but were again rebuffed. US
rejection of enosis forced the Greeks to begin to look to other anti-colonial states in
the region for support, especially the Middle East. In addition the Greeks refused to
allow American planes to land in the country during the Lebanon and Jordanian
Crises in 1957 (Woodhouse 1991, 277).
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After five years of rising tension, relations between Greece,Turkey and
Cyprus were finally resolved under an agreement that saw the emergence of the
Republic of Cyprus within the British Commonwealth. Greece returned to normal
relations with NATO, Britain, and the Americans, and seemed to show no bitterness
at all. Greece began negotiations to secure a treaty of association with the European
Economic Community (EEC) in an effort to forge closer relations with Europe.
NATO maneuvers were held in Greek and Turkish Thrace and Krushchev threatened
to rain rockets on the Acropolis (Woodhouse 1991, 280-281). Relatively, things were
back to normal in the Cold War.

Summary

The rise of the modem Greek state has been plagued with Great Power
interference. The first 150 years of its independence saw attempts to maintain some
semblance of independence while trying to bring all ethnic Greeks within one border.
Greece suffered through separate wars plus a couple of its own instigation. Through
this period, Greece was closely involved with two Great Powers that operated within
Greece and affected Greek policy with relative impunity.
For the most part, relations with its neighbors remained relatively peaceful.
The Italians were no longer enemies, and while still surrounded by Communist states,
Greece was able to maintain cordial affairs with Marshal Tito's Yugoslavia. By virtue of
its relationship with the United States, Greece was able to become a member of NATO.
Such a security guarantee did not rely so much on collective European security but more
more on a guarantee of U.S. involvement.
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The establishment of NATO provided the cornerstone of the international system
for over 40 years. The bipolar system was ideological as well as geopolitical and forced
the maintenance of the collective security system to be at the forefront of many states'
national security policies, and, in some cases, it was forced on them as part of their
security policy. For some of the larger states, this became an end rather than a means.
For smaller states, independence from such institutions or larger states is more difficult.
This is extremely important in the Greek case. For example, while Greece was following
American 'advice' and followed a standard doctrine that supported American and central
European security the relationship was fine. As Greece leaned more towards an antiTurkish stance over the Cyprus issue, relations soured.
These events also affected the NATO Alliance as a whole. Despite pretensions to
a common goal, NATO was faced with a situation it was never prepared to deal with.
Two NATO allies were becoming more concerned with the security threat each posed to
the other. Alliance cohesion in the south was beginning to buckle due to the inability of
Greece to maintain NATO's threat assessment at the forefront of her national security
policy.
The initiation of changes in Greek security policy and its effect on her
international relations, with the U.S. and NATO, is of prime importance in understanding
the problems of alliance cohesion. Greek security was not so much a reliance on
collective security, but a maintenance of its traditional relationship with a Great Power.
In exchange for relative freedom to affect Greek policy such a power would protect
Greece. As nationalism began to pervade Greek domestic politics, and hence Greek
foreign policy revolving around the Cyprus issue, the beginnings of a more independent
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Greek policy appeared to be emerging, practical or not. The emergence of Greek policy
over Cyprus and hence security from the Turks, as opposed to the Communists, would
prove to be the overriding factor in an effort to gain independence in foreign policy and
also diverge Greece from the principles of NATO ideology.
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CHAPTERJ
GREEK FOREIGN RELATIONS AND THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT

In May 1967, Greece fell to what has been its last military coup. This is
essential in understanding not only modem Greek foreign policy, but also Greek relations
with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United States. The failure of
Washington and Brussels to offer any resistance to the coup was a seminal example of
the two attempting to maintain Alliance cohesion in the region. The military government
that came to power was strongly pro-Alliance and was fully expected to maintain
Greece's NATO commitments. However, the continuity that the Alliance sought
regarding Greek membership was short lived.
The coup ended the monarchy of Greece and brought Greece to the brink of war
with Turkey over the Cyprus issue. It was not until the October 1981 elections that
brought about a populist/socialist government that independence in Greek foreign policy
was achieved. In 1981 the population went so far as to elect the anti-NATO/antiAmerican Andreas Papandreou and his Pan Hellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) to power
in protest. In essence, the military coup was the last straw of foreign interference in
Greek affairs for the populace of Greece. In this sense, and with these factors in mind, it
is relatively easy for us to understand the importance of the years Greece was under
military rule and its effect on future Greek-NATO relations.
During its time in power, from 1967 to 1974, the rule of the military had no real
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effect on its international relations as they had existed. Rather, the military government
sought to continue close ties with the United States and gave the Americans free hand in
Greece. The real effect was the change in attitude of the population. They saw that the
United States and NATO were more concerned with far reaching, grandiose security
rationales than with upholding democracy in Greece.
The military government's destructive relations with Ankara also solidified the
ongoing problems between Greece and Turkey. It gave excuse to Turkey to invade
Cyprus, which has been the source of constant friction between the two NATO 'allies.'
Not only has this affected Greek and Turkish foreign policies but it has also formed the
most dangerous relationship in the North Atlantic Alliance and has developed into a
relationship that could sunder the entire southern flank of NATO.

The Origins of the 1967 Coup - The Political Players
The origin of the April 1967 military coup in Greece is mainly one of traditional
problems among the military, the monarch, the Left, and the relationship of each to
Greek politics. In general, equilibrium existed. The military maintained foreign
relationships, through NATO and the United States, ostensibly under the purview of the
monarch. The King placated the traditional politicians and the military. The Left, while
seeking to sever the traditional Western relationships and attempting to reduce the
military and military expenditures, was normally content to be involved in the issueless
Greek politics of the day. More to the point, all three actors were generally interested in
maintaining the status quo as far as the Greek political system was concerned.
Legg states that the two most contentious issues of the day were the position of
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the Left in national politics and the priority of military expenditure (1969, 214). The
importance of these two issues lies in the strain in relations between the military
establishment and the Left The military did not really consider the Left to be a
legitimate part of the Greek political system. They were considered traitorous and
willing to sell out Greek independence to Communist/Socialism. Essentially, the military
was certain that if the Communist/Left came to power then Greece would become
dominated and influenced by the Soviet Union.
The Left, on the other hand, viewed the military as fascist. They saw the other
more traditional aspects of Greek politics, such as the former conservative governments,
as having sold-out Greek sovereignty to the West, particularly to the United States. The
Left wanted to reduce defense expenditures, withdraw from NATO, and maintain
cooperative relations with the other "peace-loving" socialist states bordering Greece.
A note here: the threat from Turkey was always a bipartisan issue and it was the
only threat the Left viewed seriously and made allowances for in military expenditures.

It should be no surprise that the main reasons for the disparate view of the Left from the
rest of the political system stem from the position of the Left during the Civil War. The
Left was not considered a national political force like the military, the King, or the
traditional politicos.
The King, on the other hand, was a useful rallying point for national sentiment
and proof of patriotism. Loyalty with the monarchy was associated with anticommunism, especially in the armed forces (Legg 1969, 215). The monarchy was very
hostile to the Left throughout its history because of traditional feelings from the Civil
War. Any change in stance by the monarchy could possibly turn the military away from
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the King. Anything other than hostility toward the Left from the monarch could reduce
the symbolic role of the King in the eyes of the military.

The Origins of the 1967 Coup - The Setting
The Premiership of Constantine Karamanlis from 1955 to 1963 was a watershed
in Greek politics. The longest serving Greek Prime Minister up to that time, Karamanlis
served for eight consecutive years. However, by the time of his departure, events were
beginning to unfold that would see Karamanlis in self-imposed exile in France and the
rise of the military government.
Initially there was concern over the visit to London, in July 1963, by King Paul
and Queen Frederika. Karamanlis was concerned about possible protests over the King's
visit, as various human-rights groups were still clamoring over political prisoners in
Greece still held from the Civil War. King Paul was adamant, however, as he had
already been diagnosed with terminal cancer and felt that any delay in the visit to Queen
Elizabeth II might result in offending the Queen. In addition, the visit was also heralded
as a capstone to better relations with Great Britain since the 1960 independence of
Cyprus (Woodhouse 1985, 1-2).
Karamanlis resigned over the incident. He cited constitutional requirements of
the King to respect the decision of the Prime Minister in such cases as state visits by the
King. He left for Zurich vowing to leave politics.
To ease the transition, however, Karamanlis acted as advisor to his National
Radical Union (ERE) in selecting a replacement. The new Prime Minister was not to
have any further inter-play in politics other than to accompany the King and Queen to
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London. Panayiotis Pipinelis was chosen, a former Ambassador and Director of King
George II's political office (Woodhouse 1985, 2).
Upon his return from London, King Paul dissolved the Parliament two years into
its four year term. Woodhouse notes that this was generally accepted to disentangle the
political situation in Greece that had seen 3 years of Field-Marshal Papagos (1952-1955)
and 8 years of Constantine Karamanlis (1955-1963). The King was quite wary of George
Papandreou's Center Union (EK) gaining power because of the latter's frequent
vows to fight the institutionalized corruption of the ERE (Woodhouse 1985, 2-3).
Elections took place on November 3, 1963. Karamanlis returned from exile to
lead his ERE, but was defeated by Papandreou for the first time. The results were: 138
seats for the EK, 132 seat for the reigning ERE, with the remaining going to the Union of
the Democratic Left (EDA), thought by many to be a front for the outlawed Communist
Party of Greece (KKE). Papandreou was asked to form a government but would be
successful only with Communist support, and asked for a dissolution of the Vouli
(parliament), which the King quickly granted. A new election, held on February 16,
1964, handily gave Papandreou's EK an overall majority of 171 seats. The ERE, now led
by Panayiotis Kanellopoulos, was reduced to 107 seats. King Paul died a few days after
swearing inPapandreou (Woodhouse 1985, 3).
Papandreou was faced with two immediate challenges. The first was the
never ending dispute with Turkey over Cyprus. The second was the rise of clandestine
groups, both right and left-wing, within the officer corps of the army. Cyprus had begun
heating up again due to the failure of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities and
their leaders to implement satisfactorily the island's constitution. In December 1963, a
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few days before Christmas, fighting broke out between the two communities. The
Greeks initially maintained the upper hand, forcing the Turkish leader Raouf Denktash
to flee to the mainland (Woodhouse 1985, 4).
In March, the UN Security Council successfully implemented a resolution
establishing a peace-keeping force (UNFICYP) centered on British troops based in the
two UK Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia. Turkish Cypriots established
enclaves for their own protection and the Turkish government threatened to intervene
but was warned off by a strongly worded diplomatic note from US President Lyndon
Johnson (Woodhouse 1985, 4).
A plan to settle the dispute presented by former US Secretary of State Dean
Acheson was accepted by the Turks but was rejected by the Greek-Cypriot President
Archbishop Makarios on the grounds that he would not yield any territory to the Turks in
a settlement. This was extremely disturbing to the US as it was desperately hoping for
stability in the Eastern Mediterranean in an effort to shore up not only NATO security in
the region, but, more importantly, Israeli security. The Government in Athens vacillated
for a time on the Acheson plan, eventually coming down in support of Makarios
(Woodhouse 1985, 5)
Fighting broke out again in August 1964 when Turkish aircraft bombed Greek
positions in the north of the island. Conflict was a real possibility as Greece withdrew
her forces from NATO command in expectation of an all-out war (Woodhouse 1991,
286). As quickly as the fighting began it subsided and a calm passed over the island.
While both sides were permitted mainland regular forces, in addition to the island-based
Cypriot National Guard, they were limited in number by signed convention. However,
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during 1964 both sides secretly increased their contingents from the mainland
(Woodhouse 1985, 5).
The second crisis that the new Papandreou government had to deal with was over
the control of the armed forces. After eleven years of right-wing government, including
three years under one of the army's own (Field Marshal Papagos ), in retrospect, it is no
surprise that the majority of the army felt sympathetic with the outgoing government.
The rise of a left-leaning regime was anathema to the majority of the officer class. This
was exacerbated as Papandreou sought to replace the upper echelon leadership with those
of his own choosing (Woodhouse 1991, 287).
Any changes in the military structure were extremely difficult. There was little
formal civilian control over military personnel. The defense budget could not be
seriously altered and foreign policy areas that might alter the relationship between the
military and NATO were closely guarded and never seriously broached. Indeed policy
differences between the military and the government were never really serious and the
Papandreou government never sought to reduce expenditures. While they were lowered
some 10 percent to help pay for social and public works programs, defense expenditures
were still 1/3 of the annual budget.
Despite international detente between East and West in the mid-to-late sixties,
Greece was still preoccupied with Turkish moves over Cyprus. Therefore the military
was never in any real danger of losing importance in the Greek national security
apparatus. Rather, the draw down in forces in the post-Civil War period had left a large
number of mid-level officers with little prospect for promotion (Veremis 1987, 220)
creating a conspiratorial atmosphere among them.

44

In addition, the eleven years of close relations between the monarch and the

prime minister had provided a stable atmosphere in which the military could exist and
stay away from any potential disputes. Unfortunately, this did not mean the military was
apolitical.

Military Politics in Greece

The role of the Greek military in the internal politics of Greece is essential in
understanding the changes in the relationship between Greece and her allies. However,
this was not an independent internal development of Greece. Rather, the Great Powers,
whether Great Britain or the United States, had always dominated the Greek military
establishment and exerted a majority of their influence in Greece through the military.
This was especially true of the United States.
The Americans assumed an initial position of influence after the British had
announced they could no longer maintain support for the Greeks in their fight against the
Communist insurgency that had erupted in late 1944. The Americans immediately
reorganized the Greek military and exerted almost total dominance over strategy,
organization, training, equipment, tactics, and advancement. In line with American
strategic thinking at the time, the Greek military was integrated into NATO planning as a
bulwark against the spreading Communist threat. The Greek military exerted a great
amount of influence over the country's foreign relations. The military was staunchly proNATO and pro-American and would not allow any presumptuous domestic force to
change that or lessen the cohesion of the Alliance in the region. However, becasue of the
unilateral American dominance and the rise of the Turkish threat the military sought to
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guarantee NATO cohesion through relations with the U.S. as opposed to her neighbor to
the east.
The Greek military also has a long history of clandestine military officer
organizations. The 'Royal Greek Middle East Forces,' under British command during
World War II~ formed a clandestine royalist/nationalist organization called/DEA, a
Greek acronym for the 'Sacred Bond of Greek Officers', of which Field Marshal Papagos,
the former Prime Minister, was a founding member. IDEA members attempted to stage a
coup on May 31, 1951 after Papagos resigned as head of the Army over a disagreement
with the government. Papagos prevented the coup and with his stature at the end of the
Civil War rode to a resounding victory to Prime Minister in 1952. With the latter's climb
to power, the clandestine organization dismantled, supposedly having achieved its goals
(Veremis 1987, 218-219).
An offshoot of IDEA, the 'National Union of Young Officers (BENA),' was

founded in 1958 by one Captain George Papadopoulos. The organization was fervently
anti-Communist, highly nationalistic, and contemptuous of parliamentary democracy
(Veremis 1987, 219). This group represented the growing factionalism in the army that
is fairly surprising, considering that, ideologically at least, the military was very unified
following the Civil War. Such groups represented more corporatist individuals
concerned with advancement. Membership in such organizations was a virtual necessity
for those who sought advancement through the officer corps.
In 1965, the Papandreou government was faced with evidence of yet another
secret society in the ranks of the army officer class. Initially, reports came from Cyprus
in the guise of General George Grivas, former head of EOKA terrorists in Cyprus, and
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now commander of the Greek Cypriot National Guard and the Greek Army contingent on
the island. As the President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios realized that General
Grivas had the real power in Cyprus. In turn, he attempted to build up the gendarmerie
under his direct control (Legg 1969, 223). What became known as ASP!DA initially was
an arrangement to undermine Grivas' powerbase in the military. Andreas Papandreou,
the Prime Minister's son and a Minister in his cabinet, visited Makarios in an effort to
find officers sympathetic to the Papandreou and Makarios governments. When Grivas
found out about the visit, and realized his position could be threatened, he went public
with the information in an attempt to damage the Papandreou administration
(Woodhouse 1991, 287).

ASP!DA in Greek means 'shield' but it was an acronym for 'Officers, Save
Fatherland, Ideals, Democracy and Meritocracy.' It was represented as a a left-wing plot,
led by Andreas Papandreou to gain influence in the military, overthrow the King, and
take control of Greece, forming a socialist state (Woodhouse 1985, 5) In reality, ASPIDA
was probably nothing more than a group of mid-range officers concerned with career
advancement. The real crisis came in the investigation of the organization.
George Papandreou's Minister of Defense was Petros Garofilias and technically
the highest power over the military. At the time the ASPIDA affair went public, King
Constantine II and opposition leaders in the Vouli wanted an immediate investigation.
Garofilias, for whatever reasons, supported the King and was fired by the elder
Papandreou. The Prime Minister then sought to take up the Defense portfolio himself,
but then that would have left George Papandreou investigating his son, Andreas (Legg
1969, 223).
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Prime Minister Papandreou resigned after threats from the King. Constantine
then sent for the President of the Parliament and asked him to form a government based
on the EK majority. After three weeks he failed. It was not until the King approached
Stephanos Stephanopoulos that a government was formed lasting until December
1966 (Legg 1969, 224).
Around this time, massive demonstrations began to be held in the major cities of
Athens and Thessaloniki. While the Left was considered the main instigators of the
demonstrations, the EK was also prominent in their support. Politics in general
degenerated. At least one fist fight erupted in the Vouli, violence erupted in the streets,
and civility in general disappeared (Legg 1969, 224 ).
The EK split and various members from all parties began defecting to others.
One new party was formed with 49 defectors from the centrist EK forming the Liberal
Democratic Center. Further defections were prevented by party loyalty to George
Papandreou. However, the Stephanopoulos government fell in December 1966. The
Governor of the National Bank of Greece, Ioannis Paraskevopoulos, was named head of a
caretaker government until new elections in the spring of 1967. It seemed that
compromises were being attempted and that equilibrium was being restored to the
political system (Legg 1969, 224).
During this time members of the alleged ASP/DA conspiracy were investigated
and tried by military court. The elder Papandreou was noted in some allegations and the
younger Papandreou, against a torrent of parliamentary anger, was kept out of court
because of parliamentary immunity. Indictments were delayed and prolonged against the
two Papandreous for their alleged involvement in the conspiracy (Legg 1969, 225). The
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alleged ring-leader of the plot, Major A. Papaterpos, received 18 years in prison
(Woodhouse 1985, 8). This only incensed the military even more against the traditional
politicians. They were tired of such constant bickering especially against their own. The
military felt "politicians and bureaucrats" were in no position to judge the officer corps,
the true defenders of the nation.
The rise of tensions between the two was further increased by economic problems
throughout 1966 and the early part of 1967. The extreme Left began to provoke the
traditional parties and the military. Athens was in a state of turmoil. Increased strikes
brought frequent clashes between demonstrators and the police. Paraskevopoulos'
government was brought down in the collapse of the coalition. The King dissolved the
parliament and the country prepared for elections for May 28, 1967. The government
decided not to prosecute Andreas Papandreou over the ASP/DA affair, suggesting his role
in the affair had been fabricated (Legg 1969, 225).
Most alarming to the stability of the political system was the real threat of an EK
victory. Despite allegations against the Papandreous, they still possessed a great deal of
popularity. In addition, given George Papandreou's age, it was likely that his son Andreas
would soon take over as party leader. Many in the military and the Right viewed such an
eventuality as the equivalent of a Communist victory considering Andreas' views on
NATO, military expenditures and the Cyprus issue (Legg 1969, 225-226).
Andreas continued to criticize nearly all elements of the political system: the
military, the monarch, even his father. On March 1, 1967 he made a speech to the
Foreign Press Association in which he abused the US Government so offensively that two
US diplomats walked out (Woodhouse 1985, 14). Information abounds of what Greeks
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call ektropi, or 'deviations.' In essence this was the euphemism for a coup d'etat.
Whether from the Left or the Right, a 'deviation' was expected after the elections. At one
stage, in September 1966, it is reported that King Constantine sent a secret message to
the exiled Constantine Karamanlis stating that if he would return to office, the King,
under the right circumstances, would arrange a 'deviation' of his own (Woodhouse 1985,
14-15).

April 21, 1967 - The Colonels' Coup

The early morning hours of April 21, 1967 saw the Greek government seized by
Army units led by three previously unknown Army officers: Colonel George
Papadopoulos, Brigadier General Stylianos Pattakos and Colonel Nikolaos Makarezos.
Their justification was an alleged Communist plot to overthrow the King. In an effort to
gain immediate favor with the population, the coup leaders claimed Royal approval for
their actions, which, in reality, did not exist. Various articles of the constitution were
suspended, and the extreme right-wing Constantine Kollias, senior Public Prosecutor to
the Supreme Court (the AreoPagus), was sworn in by the King as Prime Minister. This
civilian element was brought into being in response to the monarch's statement that he
would have no dealings with a military Prime Minister (Woodhouse 1991, 290). The
King expressed his wishes that full parliamentary government would soon be restored,
but his apparent approval of the military's actions had already sealed his fate and that of
the monarchy in Greece.
With a few minor exceptions the coup and subsequent dictatorship was an
entirely Army affair. The Army's upsetting of the democratic process in Greece was not
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new. It had happened before in Greece. What is important to note is that the populace
remained fairly apathetic to the entire event. Seemingly they were tired of the lack of
any qualitative developments by the professional politicians and welcomed any changes.
Indeed the army was always mindful that it was going to restore democracy as
soon as possible. The coup leaders always sought Royal approval for their actions,
indicting the young King more and more as an accomplice to the events.
King Constantine, in seeing his success at demanding a civilian Prime Minister,
sought to re-establish power for himself. On December 13, 1967, the King flew to
Thessaloniki in an effort to rally support. However, Army units remained loyal to the
new government. Within 24 hours the King fled to Rome with his family and Prime
Minister Kollias. Colonel Papadopoulos then appointed a regent and had himself sworn
in as Prime Minister, being careful not to abolish the monarchy. He stated that the King
had voluntarily abstained from his duties for the time being. Further confident of their
position, the leaders of the coup then ceremoniously retired from the military
(Woodhouse 1991, 293-294). In essence, the era of'crowned-democracy' in Greece had
ended.

The Allies' Response to the Coup

Initially it seemed that Greece's allies were emphatic in their denunciation of the
coup. The United States slowed arms and aid to a trickle, the European Investment Bank
of the EEC withheld a loan already agreed to, and the Council of Europe debated the
expulsion of Greece as a member (Woodhouse 1991, 293).
Since the King had sworn in the Army government, or khounta as it came to be
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known, recognition of the government came quickly. This was the first example of the
allies' apathy towards the true state of internal Greek affairs, provided Greece remained
loyal to the Western Alliance. With approval now being shown from the allies, Greece
remained sure of her security and that the Western Allies would maintain their
commitments.
The only exception to the tacit Western approval of the coup was by the
Danish Government, not least because the King and his young Queen were of Danish
descent. Denmark withdrew from a trade fair in Thessaloniki to further protest the
'abrogation of democracy and constitutional rights in Greece (Woodhouse 1985, 39).'
Norway also gave support to the Danish position, going so far as to initiate a
parliamentary debate on expelling Greece from NATO (Woodhouse 1985, 39).
Indeed the United States soon began to restore arms supplies to Greece in the
interest of maintaining security on NATO's Southern Flank. However, despite this
action, it must be noted that other allies that supplied arms, the French, Germans, and
British, never did stop supplying arms, even in protest to the coup (Woodhouse 1985,
40).
Other external opposition to the military government was led by Constantine
Karam.antis from Paris and Andreas Papandreou, who had escaped to London after a
brief period of imprisonment in 1967. Andreas had taken over the leadership role from
his father George Papandreou when the latter died on November 1, 1968 after being
released from prison for health reasons. Last was the Communist leader Brillakis.
Unfortunately none of the opposition were inclined to co-operate with each other
(Woodhouse 1991, 296).
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The reaction of the Communist party was unusual and surprising to the
military government. Division and factionalism within the party (at one point some five
groups were claiming overall leadership of the Communist Party of Greece) had defeated
any strong show against the Army. This also defeated the Army's argument that they
were saving the country from an imminent Communist coup or Communist threat
(Woodhouse 1991, 297).
The ultimate point that saved the coup leaders from condemnation was the June
1967 Arab-Israeli War, which closed the Suez Canal and seriously threatened US
interests in the region. American bases in Greece became extremely important to
US military operations in the area for resupplying Israeli forces and performing
reconnaissance missions in the Eastern Mediterranean. The importance of the bases
became more pronounced as the Soviets began expanding their Mediterranean
operations. The Egyptians leaned more to the Soviets and the pro-Western Libyan
monarchy was overthrown by the anti-Western coup of Colonel Muamar Gadhafi in 1971
(Woodhouse 1991, 298). With these mounting strategic pressures, the United States had
little choice but to accept and cultivate relations with Greece, whatever type of
government was in power.

Greek Foreign Policy Under the Military Government

The leaders of the coup placed great emphasis on maintaining Greece's security
relationship with the United States and NATO. With what seemed like tacit U.S.
approval to the military government, it is no surprise that most Greeks developed the
sense of American complicity in the coup. Indeed it is still thought generally that nothing
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can happen without the prior approval of Greece's protecting power, in this case the
United States.
The khounta's attempts to curry Western support lay in its fervent anticommunist stance. As the :military was already the most anti-Communist of political
groups in Greece, this is only logical. However, because of its attempts to maintain close
ties with the West and especially the United States, the military government became even
more dependent on the US than previous governments. By the autumn of 1971 the Greek
and American governments were negotiating the provisions of a treaty necessary to home
port the US Navy's 6th Fleet. This was extremely important to the Army government in
that it would prove Greece was an even more vital contributor to NATO than ever before.
Logistically, according to the US Navy, the Bay ofElevsis, outside of Athens, was the
most suitable place for the Fleet (Woodhouse 1985, 106). The latter was based entirely
on security considerations rather than American support for the Greek government. The
then American Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, stated it most
clearly," Our mutual security relationship with Greece has not implied in the past and
does not now imply our support for any particular government in Greece (Woodhouse
1985, 106)."
Despite determined resistance in some quarters of the US Government, the US
and Greece signed an agreement in September 1972 to home port the US 6th Fleet at
Piraeus. Again the dictatorship was enjoying political victories externally. Relations
were improved with the Communist states, and some African states as well. Relations
with European states remained intact. Better still, the French Foreign Minister visited
Athens and the Greek Foreign Minister was invited to London (Woodhouse 1991, 299).

54

However the Greek dictatorship suffered some setbacks as well. The economy
began a slow downward spiral, as various groups, foreign and domestic, began backing
out of investment dealings. Inflation increased, severely penalizing growth stimulated by
tourism. By 1973 inflation was over 30 percent (Woodhouse 1991, 302).
Colonel George Papadopoulos, the Prime Minister and most visible of the original
triumvirate, was increasing his power. In March 1972, he dismissed the King's Regent,
whom he had appointed, and assumed the office himself. In May 1973, Papadopoulos
had to deal with a mutiny in the Navy. He convinced himself that it had been inspired by
the exiled King. Papadopoulos took the opportunity to abolish the monarchy, and
introduced a 'Presidential-Republic' that was ratified by a trumped-up plebiscite at the
end of July 1973 (Woodhouse 1991, 302-303). Papadopoulos occupied the Presidency
and maintained all real power (Veremis 1987, 222).
In November 1973, however, the death knell of the dictatorship was felt by
Papadopoulos and the Army. During the night ofNovember 16-17, 1973 a sit-in was
violently broken up by armed police and Army tanks at the Athens Polytechnic. More
than twenty students died and Papadopoulos publicly congratulated the perpetrators,
turning the stomachs of most professional officers. Among them was a group determined
that Papadopoulos must go, however, the only available tool for such an operation was
Brigadier General Dimitrios Ioannidis, head of the Military Security Police (ESA)
(Woodhouse 1991, 303).
Papadopoulos was arrested on November 25, 1973 by Brigadier Ioannidis. The
Presidency was occupied by General Gizikis, who was under the control of Ioannidis.
There was little improvement in Greece's prospects. Martial law was restored and
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repression against the opposition resumed (Woodhouse 1991, 304). Again the military
government was saved over magnification by yet another war in the Middle East when
Egypt and Syria initiated war with Israel in October 1973. This being the greatest threat
ever to Israel's security, American bases in Greece yet again became of prime importance
for supporting Israel.

The Fall of the Military Government

Greece's perennial security problem, her relationship with Turkey over the
Cyprus issue, led to the final crisis of the military government and brought back a true
democratic system of government. The true problem for the dictatorship began early in
September 1967 when the Papadopoulos regime attempted to re-open negotiations over
the Cyprus issue with little success. In November 1967 General Grivas, commanderin-chief of the Greek and Cypriot forces, launched an attack against the Turkish
population in the north of the island. The Ankara government mobilized an invasion
force but was forced to back down by allied pressure. War was narrowly averted but
Greece had to dismiss General Grivas and remove all its forces sent to the island since
1963 (Woodhouse 1991, 293).
The Cyprus issue simmered between Greece and Turkey for the next 7 years until
April 1974. Initially it was due to the discovery of petroleum deposits in the northern
Aegean (Woodhouse 1991, 303). This had occurred at the end of 1973 and relations with
Turkey had steadily deteriorated. In January 1974 a new Turkish Government was
elected, under President Bulent Ecevit. On February 1, 1974, presenting his new
government to the Turkish Parliament, Ecevit spoke in favor of a federal, unilateral
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solution to the ongoing Cyprus problem. The new Greek government under General
Ioannidis responded unfavorably. However, the situation concerning Cyprus had
changed drastically a few days earlier. General Grivas, the constant thorn in the side of
Greeks and Turks alike, died on January 27 (Woodhouse 1985, 148)
Diehard supporters of Grivas, however, fought to keep his power alive by
reforming his old terrorist network, now renamed EOKA-B. Together with members of
the Greek Cypriot National Guard, they would provide the point of General Ioannidis'
ultimate plot. Looking for a way to score a major coup for his fast-crumbling position,
Ioannidis looked outwards, and Cyprus was chosen (Woodhouse 1991, 304).
General Ioannidis sought to assassinate Archbishop Makarios and install a pro-

enosis government precipitating the most sought after goal of most Greeks and GreekCypriots. Such a move would most probably have guaranteed his popularity, however,
Greece was in no real position to deal with any Turkish response to a unilateral move.
Fortunately, Makarios discovered the plot, and announced so publicly on July 6.
However, 9 days later an attack on his Presidential Palace in Nicosia attempted to
accomplish the plot. Makarios narrowly escaped, eventually arriving in London. General
Ioannidis' mouthpiece in Cyprus was propped up in Nicosia as President. However, the
Turkish military, mobilized for months for such a contingency, landed troops on the
north of the island on July 20 (Woodhouse 1991, 304).
A Greek mobilization was mounted to counter the Turkish action, but was a total
catastrophe. NATO and the US were strangely silent. The only international action
against the erupting violence was by the United Nations which passed UN Security
Council Resolution 353 calling for cease-fire and withdrawal of all foreign troops from
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the island(Brown 1991, 8).
NATO Secretary General Dr. Joseph Luns made no effort to initiate any type of
peace between the two NATO members. The British and the United States both sent
troops and aircraft to the island only to evacuate their respective nationals. No evidence
exists of any pre-emptive action on the part of NATO or the United States to stem the
spiral towards military action by the two countries (Woodhouse 1985, 156-157).
On July 24th General Ioannidis resigned at the 'urging' of other officers and
prominent civilian leaders. Constantine K.aramanlis was invited to return from his exile
in Paris and assume office. He quickly formed a coalition government, suspended
martial law, released all political prisoners, and legalized the Communist Party for the
first time since 1947. The crisis was not yet over, however. Cyprus still had to be dealt
with (Woodhouse 1991, 305).
The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee among Britain, Greece, and Turkey obliged them
to consult together if the settlement that established an independent Cyprus was ever
endangered. Each signatory had a right to act individually to restore the status quo if a
joint action was not possible. Accordingly, two separate meetings were held in Geneva
with the three powers to come to a decision. None was reached On August 14, 1974,
acting under her rights as a treaty signatory, Turkey advanced her forces further into
Cyprus, eventually occupying 40% of the island and displacing thousands of Greek
Cypriots. In turn, thousands of Turkish Cypriots, trapped in the south, fled to the British
Sovereign Base Areas ofDhekelia and Akrotiri (Woodhouse 1991, 305).
Athens openly admitted that it could do nothing to help as its forces were totally
unprepared and unable to go to war with Turkey. Most Greeks blamed their allies for the
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blunders the Ioannidis' government had gotten Greece into. Britain had failed to act
under her treaty obligations in Cyprus and the United States was accused of aiding and
abetting the Ioannidis government. The first response of the new Karamanlis government
was to withdraw Greek forces from NATO military command (Woodhouse 1991, 306).
He also demanded the removal of all US military bases from Greek soil, except insofar
as they served Greek interests. These two actions were in response to the failure of both
NATO and the US to prevent the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. At home, Karamanlis
announced that elections would take place in November, that a plebiscite would be held
on the monarchy, and an updated constitution would be adopted. The only criticism from
any quarter was from Andreas Papandreou, whose forces felt that Karamanlis was not
showing great enough severity against the military officers involved in the former
dictatorship (Woodhouse 1991, 306).

Summary

The years of military rule in Greece had a major effect on the future conduct of
Greek foreign policy. Foreign and Security policy under the dictatorship remained
relatively stable because the Army sought to maintain a close relationship with Greece's
traditional allies. However, because of the failure of the Western Alliance to respond
against the military dictatorship, Greek civilians came to resent the North Atlantic
Alliance and the United States. The latter, most Greeks believed, was the true master of
Greece's destiny. It was impossible for most Greeks to believe that anything happened to
Greece without the United States' approval or foreknowledge. Most felt that the US had
been involved in the rise of the military dictatorship through an omnipotent force called
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the Central Intelligence Agency.
The military government had ruined relations with Turkey, however. The end
result was that by 1974 Cyprus was partitioned and Greece was saved from a disastrous
war with Turkey. The only reason Greece did not go to war with Turkey was because of
the military dictatorship. The military, during the seven years of Army rule, had
developed severe morale and readiness problems, and when it came time for war with
Turkey in 1974 Greece was unable to prosecute such a conflict.
Turkey now became the most important security concern for Greece. Greece had
always placed Turkey high on her list of potential adversaries. However, Civil War and
the influence of the United States had forced the two into an alliance against
Communism. This lasted until the Cyprus crisis reared its head. While the United States
had averted conflict before, it was unable to do so in 1974.
It was in this post-military government era now that Greece would begin to truly

divert from Western Alliance policy and develop an independent foreign and security
arrangement. This had begun under Constantine Karamanlis as one of his first acts upon
returning from exile. He withdrew Greece from the combine NATO military structure,
much like France, but was still careful to not withdraw Greece from the entire Alliance
(Woodhouse 1991, 306).
The internal politics of Greece had thus far played an extremely important role in
Greek relations with the Atlantic Alliance. The cohesion of the Alliance has always been
presupposed on individual membership and a perceived threat against the Alliance.
Changes in Greek domestic politics affected Greek foreign policy and forced NATO into
an extremely uncomfortable position. While arrayed against a perceived Soviet threat,
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NATO now had to deal with two member states that viewed each other as a greater
threat. The possibility that Moscow could use the tension between the two and sunder
the Southern Flank of NATO or that other NATO members would begin to follow
individualistic, nationalistic foreign policies was becoming a major concern.
The most important effect that the military government had on future Greek
foreign policy was the rise of Andreas Papandreou. Before the coup the military segment
of Greek politics had viewed the rise of Andreas Papandreou as more of a problem than
the Communists. Papandreou's views were radical for the more conservative forces in
Greek politics: withdrawal of Greece from NATO, dominance of the Left in the political
system, true civilian control of the military, and in essence the end of military control
over military policy. The Army officers that led the dictatorship for seven years only
delayed the rise of Andreas Papandreou. His role in reshaping Greek foreign policy will
be discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER4
TBEPAPANDREOUDECADE
The fall of the Colonels' Government in 1974 resulted in the return of Greece to
Constitutional Government. For a time, the highly respected Constantine Karamanlis
led Greece, and her foreign policy, through the immediate changes Greece was making.
From 1974 to 1981 Greece's most obvious change was a gradual popular slide toward
the left end of the political spectrum leading to the election of Andreas Papandreou and
his Pan Hellenic Socialist Party (PASOK). This was the most drastic change that had
occurred in Greece since the end of the Civil War. Fear of a Leftist-dominated
government being elected in the l 960's was the reason that the military intervened in the
internal Greek political process for seven years.
This is important in understanding Greek popular reaction to continuous Great
Power intervention. In the case of the 1967 military coup it is important to note that
there was little reaction from the Great Powers in Washington and Brussels to the
military take over. As stated in the previous chapter, the US. and NATO were willing to
ignore the failure of democratic institutions in Greece as long as the new government
maintained its commitments to NATO and Alliance security policy. Alliance cohesion
was and is the prime policy of NATO, and to a large extent the United States as well.
The effect on Greece, however, was to alienate her politically. The population
sanctioned new Greek governmental policies when democracy returned in 1974, that
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distanced Greece from the US and NATO. It is important to remember that these
policies were not introduced by the Socialist or Democratic Parties, but by the
conservative New Democracy Party. The need to distance Greek foreign policy from the
influence of NATO and America was a bipartisan issue. However, the election of
Andreas Papandreou and the introduction of his ideological views greatly distorted this
issue in the years of his administration
The radical changes that Andreas Papandreou proposed were to be slowly
implemented over the coming years. It was a democratic triumph for Greece that less
than a decade after a right-wing military coup, a Socialist government was elected to
dominate the Greek political scene. However, the left-wing ideology of Papandreou was
anti-NATO and anti-American. He believed that Soviet power was necessary to counter
American capitalist expansion, and he withdrew Greek forces from the military
command structure of NATO, much like the French, with whom close relations were
maintained
Papandreou also cultivated relations with various international pariahs and other
third-world leaders, including Muamar Gadhafi of Libya, Manuel Noriega of Panama,
and Yassir Arafat of the PLO (the latter before it became fashionable to do so).
Papandreou supported the Soviet shootdown of a Korean Air Lines passenger liner over
Sakhalin Island and courted the Polish General/President Jarulzelski, to the consternation
of the NATO allies.
Ultimately, Papandreou developed the most independent Greek foreign policy
since the Premiership ofEleftherios Venizelos, who entered Greece in the Balkan Wars.
For example, to balance the dominance of the US in NATO, he continued Greece's
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entrance in the European Economic Community. In addition, he still maintained Greece
in NATO. Papandreou's security concerns revolved around Turkey. Therefore, NATO,
however bad relations between the two might be, still remained the best defense against
a Greco-Turkish War.
The importance of this period in Greek foreign policy cannot be underestimated.
While Papandreou, as we shall see in the coming pages, was more rhetorical than
practical in his foreign policy, he still was tied to a close relationship with a great power.
The rhetoric he used stirred popular support for his party. In the end he had returned
Greek relations and image abroad into one almost worse than that of the military
government.

The Return of Civilian Rule to Greece

True changes in Greek foreign policy did not begin with Andreas Papandreou's
socialist party, but with the return of democracy to Greece in 1974. On November 17,
1974 Constantine Karamanlis' New Democracy (ND) party won an overwhelming 54
percent and 220 of 300 seats in the Vouli. A few weeks later, the population held a
plebiscite on the monarchy resulting in some 69 percent to 31 percent against the return
of the King. A Presidential Republic was established, much along the lines of the French
system of government. Papandreou denounced the power the President was given and
haggling among the various groups eventually lowered the power of the Presidency,
against the wishes ofKaramanlis (Woodhouse 1991, 306-307).

In February 1975, yet another conspiracy of Army officers was discovered.
Supposedly this was sponsored by General Ioannidis from his prison cell. For whatever
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reason, the clumsy attempt was put down before it even started, and Greek democracy
continued to be rebuilt (Woodhouse 1985, 172).
Externally, Karamanlis hoped to move Greece to a more mature stage, more on a
par with other European states. This was necessary to gain acceptance from other
European countries and to Karamanlis this could only be realized economically and
politically by resuming negotiations with the EC and entering Greece on a full course
towards integration with the rest of Europe. The Council of Europe soon welcomed
Greece back and the EEC restarted its Treaty of Association, but negotiations were not
begun for full Greek membership just yet. In addition, ministerial level relations were
restored with Greece's neighbors, Eastern and Western European (Woodhouse 1991,
308).
Relations with NATO were initially terminated, in reaction to the lack of a
NATO/US response to Turkey's invasion of northern Cyprus. Greece was withdrawn
from the military command only, further emphasizing Greece's security concerns as not
being parallel with those of the Alliance. Relations were further strained when, in March
1976, the US began a defense co-operation agreement with Turkey that provided over $1
billion in American military aid over four years in exchange for continued US use of
military bases in Turkey. The Greek government quickly moved to secure a similar
agreement with the Americans for $700 million. This event established what became
known as the 7 to 10 ratio among the US, Greece and Turkey. It was an unofficial
measure of aid to Greece and Turkey that soon became a major political tool (Brown
1991, 33-34). By the end of the seventies, Karamanlis was renegotiating Greece's return
to full membership with NATO. Talks were obstructed by the US and Turkey because of
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continued problems with both countries (Woodhouse 1991, 315). The primary reason for
continued US-Greek friction was Karamanlis' unilateral cancellation of the home porting
agreement for the US 6th Fleet (Woodhouse 1985, 171 ). While not totally normalized,
Greece's foreign policy and relations were returning to something more typical.
Attempts to maintain a more independent Greek foreign policy were begun
by Karamanlis. He cultivated better relations with other Balkan states, culminating in
two Balkan conferences on trade, tourism, communications and other technicalco-operation. He approached Communist states, allowing the Soviets port visits, and the
Chinese to observe Greek military maneuvers. He also visited Prague, Budapest, and
Peking (Woodhouse 1991, 314 ).
Karamanlis also resumed friendly relations with most of the Arab states. Greece
was able to maintain close relations with countries in the Middle East due to her
unofficial recognition of Israel, thus staying on the good side of relations with the Arabs.
Around this time, Andreas Papandreou, as leader of one of the main opposition parties,
began courting some of the more revolutionary Arab leaders including Arafat, Assad and
Gadhafi (Woodhouse 1991, 314). Relations with these countries would later prove to be
one of the main problems of Greek relations with the West and the US.

The Rise of Papandreou

On November 20, 1977, a general election returned Constantine Karamanlis to
power and brought Andreas Papandreou's Pan Hellenic Socialist Party as the official
opposition. The rise in popularity of the socialist party was very disconcerting to
Karamanlis. While he still had a mandate to continue negotiations to further Greek
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interests, Papandreou also had a mandate to vigorously oppose Karamanlis' moves.
Papandreou threatened to withdraw Greece from the EEC and NATO and promised a
much tougher stance towards Turkey and the United States. Papandreou's rhetoric
lightened as elections came nearer in October 1981(Woodhouse1991, 318).
Despite this rhetoric from Papandreou, Greece acceded as a full member to the
European Economic Community on May 28, 1979. The ratification of the treaty in the
Greek parliament was easy because Papandreou's party boycotted the debate. The treaty
passed 191 votes in favor to 2 against accession (Woodhouse 1991, 318). In addition,
Karamanlis continued to attempt to restore Greece to full NATO membership but was
constantly blocked by the Turkish government. On September 12, 1980, a coup
in Ankara by Chiefs of Staff of the Turkish military was welcomed in Turkey and abroad.
The terms of Greece's re-entry into NATO were then quickly settled and no problems
were heard from Ankara (Woodhouse 1991, 318-319).
One thing still remained in opposition to the rise of the socialists in Greece
however. That was Karamanlis himself His popularity was enough to maintain
support for his New Democracy party despite the prevalence of support for Papandreou's
socialists. In June 1980, Karamanlis stood for the Presidency and despite being bitterly
opposed by PASOK, Karamanlis won. He resigned from the office of Prime Minister and
assumed his new office on May 15, 1981. Succeeding him as Prime Minister was George
Rallis, the Foreign Minister (Woodhouse 1991, 319).
On October 18, 1981 elections were held that commenced many major changes in
Greek politics. First was the confirmation of democratic institutions in Greece. Less
than 7 years after the fall of the military government, Greece had succeeded in two
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peaceful transitions of power. Second, only seven years after a military coup designed
to prevent the rise of Andreas Papandreou's socialist ideas from taking root in Greece, the
Pan Hellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) peacefully took over the reins of power and
brought Andreas Papandreou to the Premiership of Greece. Last, it signified great
changes in Greek foreign policy that were the basis of PASOK's election platform:

ALLAGI! - or CHANGE! (Clogg 1993, viii).

Papandreou's Foreign and Security Policy
Andreas Papandreou's foreign policy can be divided into two areas: rhetoric and
reality. In general, it can be argued that his rhetoric in 1973-1974 was the main reason
that the military feared a leftward shift in Greek policy. Such a shift was unacceptable to
the traditionally conservative military. In reality none of what Papandreou argued would
be carried out. Greece was not withdrawn from NATO, rather Greece joined the EEC in
an attempt to balance the dominance of the United States over Greek foreign policy. The
best example of the reality can be seen early in the Papandreou administration when
Greece took her turn as President of the EEC Council of Ministers in July 1983 despite
rhetoric that Greece would be withdrawn from the Community (Woodhouse 1991, 320).
Relations with NATO were additionally pragmatic. In the summer of 1982
Greece began high level talks with NATO and the US over the issue of bases in Greece.
Many viewed this as a restoration of normal relations among the three. Furthermore,
relations with Turkey were almost normalized. In July 1982 both the Greek and Turkish
governments announced a moratorium on provocative acts and six months later
Papandreou made a friendly reference to the Turkish role in the Aegean (Woodhouse
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1991, 320).
Unfortunately Papandreou was not able to maintain ties with the West very well.
This stemmed mostly from his relationship with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In
addition Papandreou received very harsh reaction from the West concerning Greece's
stance on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1981 and the Soviet shootdown of the
Korean Air Lines 747 in August 1983. Athens initially condemned the invasion of
Afghanistan but then ceased to say anything more on the subject. The 1983 Soviet
shootdown of the KAL 747 provoked only 'regret' from Papandreou (Michalopoulos
1988, 363). Later in 1984, Papandreou made even more negative impact on Greek
relations with the West when he stated," ..if such a plane came into Greece, we would
have downed it (Pyrros 1988, 24 7)." In all fairness to Papandreou, though, his continued
cultivation of relations with the East was started by Constantine Karamanlis in the years
immediately after the end of the dictatorship in a spirit of detente any leader in Western
Europe would have envied (Woodhouse 1991, 321).
In opposition to NATO, Papandreou criticized the deployment of nuclear-tipped
Cruise and Pershing missiles (Verney 1993, 142) and he also blocked the creation of a
new NATO command (the Seventh Allied Tactical Air Force) at the Greek Air Force
Base in Larisa. War games were canceled with the United States and US Navy flights
over the Aegean were protested. Voice of America broadcasts were restricted. Most
importantly, Greece withdrew from a NATO exercise in September 1983 after the
Alliance agreed with Turkey to exclude the Greek island ofLimnos from the exercise
(Kapsis 1988, 46). In response to perceived US siding with Turkey, the Athens
government refused to allow a US warship to load ammunition at the Souda Bay Naval
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Base. The ship was destined to resupply US Marines in Beirut (Snyder 1987, 54).
Continued Greek policy away from NATO doctrine made the US impatient. They
threatened to hold up a sale of new fighter aircraft to Greece. The US even intimated
that the 7 to 10 ratio between Greece and Turkey may be upset (Woodhouse 1991, 325).
This did not deter Greece from initiating the 'New Defense Doctrine' of 1985. Essentially
the new doctrine was a reorganization and redeployment of the armed forces in response
to the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Before 1974, the Greek Army was stationed
along the borders of Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, with one infantry division along
the Turkish border in Thrace. The 1985 reorganization, however, deployed an entirely
new Army Corps - D Corps' - along the Turkish border. It is the only corps in the Greek
Army that is maintained at 100% combat readiness (Brown 1991, 94). In addition to
Army redeployments, four new air bases were built in the Aegean for the Air Force,
becoming operational in the late 1970's (Brown 1991, 96). The new doctrine was based
on Turkey's new Fourth Army of the Aegean, deployed after 1974 (Kapsis 1988, 48).
This new organization was responsible for mobilization and training of Turkish forces in
case of war. It was also responsible for operations against Greece in the Aegean should
the two ever go to war (Brown 1991, 97-99).
Such action on the part of the Greek government drew widespread reaction from
other NATO members. Many felt that the new policy of treating Turkey as her main
enemy would inhibit the supply of military aid from individual states, such as West
Germany, or collectively from the EEC or NATO. NATO even had to omit Greece and
Turkey from the Annual Defense Review in 1984 due to unresolved problems
(Woodhouse 1991, 327)
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Greco-Turkish relations had begun to deteriorate again in 1983. RaufDenktash,
leader of the Turkish community on Cyprus, declared that the northern portion of the
island would henceforth be known as the sovereign Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus. The action was condemned by Greece, the United States and the UN
Security council. Despite reports of anger from Ankara over the unilateral declaration,
Turkey was and still is the only country to recognize the area. Ankara has also stated that
it will guarantee the independence of the Turkish Cypriots with the 18,000 Turkish
troops that are maintained on the island (Snyder 1987, 55-56). Greek and Turkish
intractability over the issue nearly led to war again in March 1984 when Greek and
Turkish naval vessels fired on each other (Woodhouse 1991, 326).
Papandreou continued to cultivate ties among the Eastern Bloc states. He visited
Warsaw and Moscow and gave support to a Romanian initiative to establish a nuclearfree zone in the Balkans, in total opposition to NATO policy. As a sign of the
importance the Soviet Union placed on relations with Greece, the late Yuri Andropov's
son was appointed the Soviet Ambassador to Greece (Woodhouse 1991, 324).
Papandreou also attempted to promote Greek relations in other areas of the
world. In October 1983 he hosted the Socialist Prime Ministers of Portugal, Spain,
France, and Italy in Athens. The next year he visited Scandinavia, Libya, Jordan, Syria,
and India. As a result of these visits, Greece became a member of a six-nation club
against nuclear weapons. The other states included Sweden, India, Argentina, Mexico,
and Tanzania. Papandreou even tried to put a stop to the civil war in Chad by inviting
Francois Mitterand of France and Muamar Gadhafi to Crete in an effort to settle their
dispute (Woodhouse 1991, 325).
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Papandreou's policies had proven very popular with the electorate. However,
many on the Right felt that another PASOK victory could lead to another coup or
possibly even civil war. In reality such Right-wing rhetoric was overblown. Elections
were set for June 2, 1985 and Papandreou maintained his majority, though it was reduced
by seven seats (Woodhouse 1991, 330-331).
With his mandate confirmed for the second time, Papandreou continued with his
foreign policy changes. Greece came under severe fire from all quarters in June 1985
when TWA Flight 847, bound to New York from Athens and via Rome was hijacked in
Greece by Shi'a Muslim extremists. Greece suffered another jolt to her tourist industry
and international prestige as various unsolved political murders and other terrorist actions
continuously rocked the country for the rest of the 1980's (Pyrros 1988, 245-246).
Greek prestige was coming under almost constant fire as Papandreou maintained
close relations with many terrorist-sponsoring states in the Middle East. Papandreou
continued to spurn the Western European governments as well. In 1984 Papandreou
visited Poland, the first Western leader to visit since the imposition of martial law there
in 1981. Papandreou attacked the sanctions the West had placed on the Polish military
regime. In addition, he declared the West full of'capitalist regimes' and denounced the
anti-social actions of the 'Solidarity' movement (Pyrros 1988, 242-243).
Papandreou continued to expand relations with what could be termed socialist
states. He visited Romania and Bulgaria, and the new President Sartzetakis visited East
Germany. General Jarulzelski was invited to Athens, despite being shunned by the rest of
Western Europe. Meanwhile, Papandreou limited relations with the Western Alliance to
formal gatherings and meetings (Woodhouse 1991, 340).
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One of the more important actions of the Papandreou government affected a
uniquely Greek problem and represented one of the only true independent Greek foreign
policy initiatives of the period. Since 1940, Greece and Albania had been officially at
war with each other. Albania's relations with any state since the end of World War II had
been anything but friendly. However, in November 1985 academics from Athens and
Tirana began meeting and discussing co-operative ventures. Eight months later official
diplomatic discussions were initiated. Unfortunately, relations between the two began to
be hampered from the opposition in Greece. The cause was concern over the rights of
ethnic Greeks in southern Albania, or what Greece refers to as northern Epirus. In
exchange for guarantees of greater human rights and autonomy for the ethnic Greeks in
Epirus a formal termination of war was signed by the leadership of both states in August
1987. This was followed by reciprocal visits by the Foreign Ministers of both countries
in early 1988 (Brown 1991, 38-39).
The future of US bases in Greece was a continual thorn in relations between the
Papandreou government and the various American administrations. In October 1985 the
US announced that all nuclear weapons would be withdrawn from Greece, although no
one had ever admitted that they were there in the first place. Various reports indicate
that nuclear weapons were based in Greece until much later indicating that a secret
agreement on their basing was reached (Pranger 1988, 254 ).
After that, relations between the two revolved more around the purchase by
Greece of 40 American F-16 Fighting Falcons to update the Greek Air Force. The sale
was allowed in 1986 after an agreement by Greece to prevent technology leakage to the
USSR (Woodhouse 1991, 344 ).
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The current agreement was set to end in December 1988 and as that date
approached, both sides seemed eager to begin discussions of the bases. Discussions were
marred in 1987 by an attack on a bus carrying American military personnel to Hellenikon
Air Base. Perpetrated by a Greek terrorist group calling itself "November 17," the act
was condemned by all sides (Pranger 1988, 257). In either case, Hellenikon Air Base,
and the nearby Nea Makri Communications Center were scheduled to be closed in 1989
and 1990 respectively as a result of worldwide reductions on the part of the US
(Woodhouse 1991, 345).
Indecision was rampant on the part of the Greeks due to upcoming elections in
June 1989. The Greeks were also looking for added safeguards in any future basing
agreement. Between NATO and the United States, Greece has constantly looked for a
safeguard of her frontiers to be guaranteed by one or both of these allies. However,
neither was willing to accept it in the context of the North Atlantic Treaty. Greece felt
that, due to unclear language in the charter, the Alliance should guarantee the defense of
any Treaty signatory from attack from any quarter. This was obviously a reference to
Turkey. All Alliance members objected (Pranger 1988, 258). Greece has concluded
that such action on the part of the NATO members proves without a doubt that Turkey is
judged more important to the Alliance. This was one of the first official Greek
objections to NATO policy that considered Greek security concerns to be secondary to
the Communist/Soviet threat NATO was arrayed against officially.
Near the end of Papandreou's second term in office, relations with Turkey again
came to a head. The Cyprus issue was still a major source of friction, however, other
areas of Greco-Turkish relations came to the forefront in 1986 and 1987. Yet again,
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Greece and Turkey, two NATO 'allies,' were fighting more than co-operating.
December 1986 saw a crisis on the mutual border between Greece and Turkey in
Thessaly/Thrace. On the 19th two Turkish soldiers and one Greek soldier died after an
exchange of fire between border patrols on the Evros River (Pranger 1988, 262). Three
months later, in March 1987, the situation became much worse. The Papandreou
government had, since December 1981, continuously threatened to exercise Greece's
right to extend her sovereignty claim to 12 miles over all two-thousand islands in the
Aegean Archipelago. Essentially this would have made the Aegean a Greek lake,
leaving only about 19 percent of the Aegean as international waters as opposed to the
present 48.5 percent international waters. The real reason Greece wanted to extend her
territorial sea rights was due to supposed petroleum deposits around the Greek island of
Thasos. Greece and Turkey both immediately sent seismic research vessels to the area
under naval escort. Tensions increased until NATO and the United States pressured
Turkey to withdraw (Pranger 1988, 263).
Despite continued protestations from both sides, relations warmed between the
two countries. In November 1987 Papandreou went so far as to congratulate the Turkish
Prime Minister Ozal on his re-election. In January 1988 the two met at the annual World
Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland. While nothing substantive came about, many
procedural innovations were initiated. First, the two established a 'hot-line' phone
system connecting the two capitals; second, two joint committees were created to
handle political and economic relations between the two, and third, the two agreed to
meet at least twice a year in each other's capital. The thaw in relations was marred,
however, by riots between Greek police and ethnic Turks in the northern Greek city of
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Komotini the same month (Woodhouse 1991, 348).
Relations between the two countries proceeded normally for the rest of
Papandreou's term. The special committees set up at Davos achieved very little. The
new President of Cyprus, George Vasiliou, met with the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf
Denktash. However, talks between the two ended abruptly when Denktash demanded the
official recognition and independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.
March 1988 saw Greece protesting yet again to airspace violations by US and Turkish
aircraft on a NATO exercise. In May, two Turkish diplomatic automobiles were bombed
by unknown assailants and in return the Turkish government stressed the violation of
human rights by Greek police against the Turkish minority in Greek Thrace, sparked by
more riots in the Greek city of Komotini in January 1990. But by that time, Papandreou
and his Socialists were already out and a new Greek government was in place.

Summary

The end result of Andreas Papandreou's Socialist Government from 1981 to
1989 was an increase in rhetorical hostility between the US and Greece. Little love was
lost among the other NATO members either. It must be remembered, though, that
Papandreou was not the initiator of many of the policies he condoned. Most were begun
from 1974 to 1981 by Constantine Karamanlis in reaction to the failure of the US and
NATO to react to Turkey's invasion of Cyprus. Rhetoric aside, Papandreou carried out a
foreign policy very similar to that initiated by Karamanlis.
Papandreou's relations with the Eastern Bloc states and the USSR demonstrated a
pragmatic approach to detente as well as one that he knew would balance the dominance
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of NATO and the US in Greek foreign policy. No doubt his policies were appreciated by
the Soviets who enjoyed any problems that NATO had to deal with. This was especially
important where the USSR had dealings in the Eastern Mediterranean and her Middle
East client states. In many cases these were the same states with which Papandreou was
developing relations. It was certainly a feather in his cap to be courted by both superpowers, the NATO Alliance notwithstanding.
Relations with the US were also counter-balanced by the development of Greece's
ties to the European Economic Community. Despite his pre-election rhetoric to the
contrary, Papandreou never seriously considered withdrawing from the EEC. It was the
only organization that Greece was a member of that did not include the US or Turkey. In
addition it promoted closer relations between Papandreou and his Socialist ally Francois
Mitterand of France. Close relations with one of the great leaders of European unity was
another quiver for Papandreou's bow, and was another way of balancing US and NATO
dominance over Greece.
These were major stepping stones in Greece's attempt to lessen foreign influence
in her foreign policy. For the NATO Alliance, however, this was a drastic example of
policy divergence by a member state. To make matters worse, the continued problems
between Greece and Turkey were dominating their security policies at the expense of
their NATO readiness commitments. Officially, NATO was still including the two in
NATO planning as much as possible. Realistically, Greece was distancing herself from
NATO policy.
In the Greek view the NATO threat assessment was not applicable to Greece.
Withdrawing totally from NATO was never a real consideration for any Greek
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administration, including Andreas Papandreou's. The advantages of remaining in NATO,
intelligence, easier weapons procurement, and the prestige of membership in the
Alliance. These advantages, which transcended traditional alliance foundations of
combining against a common threat, began to transform the basis of NATO Alliance
cohesion.
In essence, though, the Cold War ended for Greece in 1974. From then on she

dealt with what she felt was a more immediate threat. Tensions with Turkey have flared
up many times since 1974, continuing to cast a shadow over the region and reducing any
possibility of dealing with the Cyprus issue.
The real issue revolves around the semblance of independence that Papandreou
built up as opposed to any real socialist dogma that he preached. Greece still is forced to
rely on NATO and the US for many defensive considerations. During any crisis between
Greece and Turkey it is always NATO and the US that must settle the situation. This is
as much a result of continued US influence with the Turkish governments as with its
relations with the Papandreou government. However, Greece under Papandreou built
up close relations with other powers and began to balance the influence of any single
dominating country or organization. In the next chapter, the post-Papandreou era will be
examined. There is where we shall see if dependence or independence of policy was
maintained.
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CHAPTERS
GREECE IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

The end of the 1980's saw the return of Greek foreign policy to a more stable
relationship with her allies. This was partly because of the end of the Cold War, which
decreased allied antagonism against Greece's defensive stance in the Southern Flank.
The end of the traditional threat against the Alliance decreased the influence Washington
and Brussels had over Athens and other member states. However, the new government
of Greece, as well as the rest of the Alliance, viewed the benefits of co-operation and
good relations with the Alliance as more favorable than terminating NATO. Elections in
1989-90 brought about the end of the revolutionary changes that Andreas Papandreou
made in attempting to bring about an independence of Greek foreign policy. In his place
was the government of Constantinos Mitsotakis and rapprochement with the West.
The end of the Cold War had changed much about the relationship between
Greece and her traditional allies. Greece was no longer a lonely outpost of the EC and
NATO in the region. Turkey had proved itself a reliable ally in the Gulf War and was
garnering prestige and aid for her role. Greece, however, was delaying peace in the
former Yugoslavia over problems with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
This threatened to expand the. already bloody war in the area. Greece was failing to
endear herself to Europe and the Americans over very nationalistic priorities once more.
Greece also continued to maintain that her primary security threat lay to the east
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as opposed to the north and this was even more pronounced with the end of the Cold
War. As recently as September 1995 the Greek military held a series of combined-arms
maneuvers in Thrace and Cyprus ("Parmenion '95", "Philippos '95", and "Nikiphoros '95)"
which, based on the scenarios for each, were based on an 'eastern' threat (Blaveris 1995,
16-24). Crises with Turkey have occurred on and off and have become a staple of
relations between the two. Incidents on the inter-Thracian border and Greek Air Force
intercepts of stray Turkish fighters over the Aegean are common and increase the tension
in the area, especially on the islands off the Turkish coast.
However, Greece has participated much more in recent years in NATO
operations, sending troops to Bosnia and ships to the Adriatic. She supported the US in
the Gulf War and reversed her formerly hostile stance that dominated her relations with
the US and NATO in the 1980's. Most of these support operations have catered to
general relations with her allies, but have not dominated her foreign policy.

The 1989-1990 Greek Elections

The June 1989 elections in Greece brought about a defeat of Andreas
Papandreou's revolutionary ideas of foreign policy and halted the Greek political process.
The election resulted in Constantinos Mitsotakis' New Democracy gaining 44.2 percent,
Papandreou's PASOK 39 .1 percent, and the Alliance, a left-wing communist coalition,
received 13.1 percent. Without a clear majority, an unorthodox partnership was formed
between New Democracy and the Alliance. The coalition was formed specifically to
prosecute a number of PASOK ministers over embezzlement scandals with the Bank of
Crete and other misdeeds. Papandreou was also implicated and criminal charges were
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brought forward. With this accomplished, the unorthodox coalition called for new
elections set for November 5, 1989 (Brown 1991, 35-36).
The second round elections in November failed to produce a clear majority again.
New Democracy increased its share of the vote to 46.2 percent as did PASOK, increasing
to 40.6 percent. The Left Wing Coalition won 10.9 percent and independents won 2.3
percent. After some bickering, an all-party government was formed under Xenophon
Zolotas, former governor of the Bank of Greece. The temporary government was formed
to deal with domestic and economic issues only and to prepare for yet another election.
Foreign and security policy matters were placed on the back-burner as elections were
scheduled for April 8, 1990 (Brown 1991, 36).
Finally, Constantine Mitsotakis achieved a majority government in this third
election in six months. His leadership was very fragile, though. Costas Stephanopoulos,
a conservative independent, won a single seat and pledged it to New Democracy and
Mitsotak:is. The majority was one seat, giving Mitsotakis 151 seats (in the 300 seat

Vouli). PASOK lost seats, dropping to 123, and the Alliance won 19. Two seats were
acquired by Moslem representatives from the small Turkish minority in Western Thrace.
A small 'Green' movement won a single seat, and four more were won by joint SocialistCommunist candidates (Brown 1991, 36).
With his victory, however weak, Mitsotakis was able to redress critical foreign
policy issues that had been set aside for the previous six months. One of the first issues
Mitsotakis had to deal with was the US bases agreement. However, before the June 1989
elections, New Democracy argued, the previous PASOK government had agreed to 80
percent of the new defense and co-operation agreement with the US (Couloumbis 1993,
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119).
The drastic changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union rendered many US
bases and operational facilities redundant. However, the August 1989 Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait again made the US bases in Greece extremely important as a transshipment point
for military material headed for the Gulf from Europe and the US. Mitsotakis had also
made amends with the US such that a Greek frigate, the Elli, was sent to work in the Red
Sea with French and US naval forces to enforce UN sanctions against Iraq crMake
friends ... ' 1991, 46). In August 1993, though, the United States announced that it would
be returning its last bases in Greece (Iraklion Air Station and US Navy facilities at Souda
Bay, both on Crete) to the host country ('USAF Overseas Operations' 1993, 10).
The post-Gulf War era found the US and Greece in conflict almost immediately.
While Greece had allowed US bases to support troops throughout the Gulf War, Turkey
had allowed US bases in that country to be staging areas for bombing missions over Iraq.
To reward Turkey, the Bush administration wanted to increase aid from $550 million to
$700 million US dollars while holding the Greek share to around $350 million, the same
as the previous year. This would have severely upset the 7: 10 ratio that had for so long
been a main point of US policy in the region after the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus.
The ratio was seen by the Greek and American governments as necessary to the
maintenance of the balance of power in the region. Greek-American pressure against the
US congress tends to increase when the ratio is in jeopardy (Make friends ... ' 1991, 4647).
The Greek outcry at the proposal was also challenged by the European
Community. Since 1984, Greece had been blocking an aid package to Turkey consisting
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of 800 million US dollars. The EC was now trying to get Greece to back off in an effort
to provide Turkey with a post-war aid package. However, Greece refused to back down
on the issue until Turkey made progress on relations concerning Cyprus ('Make friends ... '
1991, 47).
Mitsotakis also conflicted with the US (and Turkey) over the Conventional Forces
in Europe Treaty signed between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The disagreement hinged
on the southern Turkish port of Mersin. The Turkish government wanted the area
excluded; the Greeks wanted it included. Geographically the port is in the Middle East,
therefore the Turks stated it fell totally outside the CFE boundaries. However, to the
Greek government the port was the base from which the Turkish invasion of Cyprus was
launched in 1974. It continues to be the primary resupply port for Turkish forces on the
island as well. The 'Mersin' question was shelved by Greece after NATO and US
opposition was announced. Neither wanted to see the CFE process bogged down over
this single issue. Athens has not dropped the issue totally, however, contending that it is
still open (Brown 1991, 36-37).
Greece and Turkey also conflicted over Turkey's unilateral enlargement of the
region over which she claims search-and-rescue jurisdiction. The Turks unilaterally
doubled the region's size in the Black Sea, the Aegean, and the Mediterranean. This
essentially allowed her coverage over half of Greece's Aegean islands and was an affront
to Greek sovereignty. Turkey backed off on the issue and the two countries agreed to
discuss it in the future (Brown 1991, 36).
The Mitsotakis administration had thus far had its hands full in foreign affairs;
but there were more problems to come. The collapse of the former federation of
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Yugoslavia created difficulties for many surrounding states, Greece included. Many
European governments considered the resulting problems ridiculous. It was not
ridiculous for Mitsotakis and Greece, however, as it brought down the government.

The Macedonian Question

The collapse of the former Yugoslavia saw a small country in the central Balkans
come to independence in 1991. The future name of this small country has been the
subject of a debate that ended only in 1996. When the ex-Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia declared its independence it opened a Pandora's box that affected
international relations throughout Europe and brought down the Greek government.
The initial problems resulted when Greece vetoed a European Union initiative to
recognize the new country. Greece, led by Prime Minister Constantinos Mitsotakis and
Foreign Minister Andonis Samaras refused to budge on the issue. They regarded the
Macedonian use of the sunburst symbol on her flag, certain articles in her new
constitution, and her name, affronts to the Greek nation. The main reason was Greek
worries of future Macedonian irredentism. Greece's north-central province is called
Macedonia. In addition, popular support against the new country's use of these 'clearly'
Greek symbols, was forcing the Greek government to stand firm.
Greek intransigence on the issue lost her immediate favor with many Western
governments. The EC and the US put immediate pressure on Greece to ease up its
policy. The Greek government was split on what do. The young Foreign Minister
stated publicly that the issue was non-negotiable. The name and flag of the country had
to be changed as well as the offending articles in the constitution. Prime Minister
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Mitsotakis, on the other hand, was willing to compromise. Months of public bickering
between the two led to Mitsotakis' firing of Samaras on April 13, 1992 ('Balkanised'
1992, 47-48).
Mitsotakis did not have public opinion on his side. Most Greeks supported
Samaras' hard line stand on the issue. Almost immediately after firing Samaras
Mitsotakis endorsed his former Foreign Minister's views referring to the area by
the name of the capital, 'Skopje'. Mitsotakis continued to block EC recognition of the
state. In fact, no states had recognized the Macedonians except for Turkey and Bulgaria.
Greece was the linchpin to Macedonia. Being a land-locked state forced Macedonia
to use the northern Greek port of Thessaloniki for trade. Greece instituted a unilateral
trade-ban on the state, that, coupled with her veto of the EC motion, effectively isolated
the Macedonian government and its economy. Macedonia was thought to be losing over
$1.3billion a year in trade to the Greek embargo. In an effort to curry favor with the EC,
Macedonia applied sanctions against Serbia, formerly her largest trading partner. Rising
ethnic tension in the country also worried Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov that
without UN representation the fighting in the former-Yugoslavia could spread ('The
price .. .' 1992, 39-40).
A May 1992 meeting in Lisbon of EC ministers brought no change between
Greece and the Community, one minister being quoted as saying that the Greek policy
toward Macedonia was "rubbish." Only Hans-Dietrich Genscher of Germany and Giulio
Andreotti of Italy supported the Greeks, stating that the EC should not push any member
on an issue of supreme national interest ('The sick man.. .' 1992, 55-56).
EC support turned around, however, when Mitsotakis, now acting as his own
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Foreign Minister, called each of the other 11 leaders to change their minds and support
Greece on the issue. Not only did Mitsotakis assure the others that his government
would fall if he took a different stance on the issue, but the other 11 leaders realized that
the only alternative to Mitsotakis would be the return of Andreas Papandreou's Socialist
PASOK party. In exchange for support, Mitsotak:is agreed to end Greece's long-time
relationship with Serbia, apply sanctions against Serbia, and join in the UN flotilla
enforcing sanctions in the Adriatic. This agreed to, the new president of the EC, Great
Britain, quietly hinted to Skopje that the EC's position would be reviewed unless
Macedonia changed her name ('Less prickly' 1992, 53-54).
August 1992 saw Mitsotak:is announce that the former Minister of Justice,
Michali Papaconstantinou, would be the new Foreign Minister, and Papaconstantinou
appeared to be content to keep quiet. Greece also curried favor with the EC by passing
the Maastricht Treaty quickly and overwhelmingly ('A new.. .' 1992, 40). The
Macedonian problem still persisted for the Greeks and would crest in the next year.
In October 1992, Mitsotakis saw his majority fall to one seat, when Mikis
Theodorakis, the Greek composer, decided to sit as an independent. Andonis
Samaras also resigned from the New Democracy Party the same month after the majority
of the party sided with Mitsotakis. Domestic policy of attempting to prosecute tax
evaders was also lessening Mitsotak:is' support at home and he continued to be
surrounded by others who threatened to defect and end the ruling ND mandate ('With
closed.. .' 1992, 60).
The following year, 1993, saw advances finally in the Greco-Macedonian debate.
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was admitted to the United Nations
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though President Gligorov disapproved of the formal name. This name was also used by
Gligorov to join the International Monetary Fund and the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development and end Skopje's diplomatic and economic isolation.
Mitsotakis and Gligorov both seemed eager to end the 15-month old dispute. The issue

was getting desperate for Mitsotakis, however. At home, he had barely survived a vote of
no confidence brought about by the Papandreou's PASOK party. And two days
previously he had had to rebuff his own party at a caucus ('A country by... ' 1993, 50-51).
July 1993 was the beginning of the end for the Mitsotakis government. Andonis
Samaras formed his own party, Political Spring, and quickly gained much support from
others in the New Democracy Party. On September 7 Stefanos Stephanopoulos defected
to Political Spring followed by George Symbilidis on September 9th. Mitsotakis'
majority was now at 150, and, true to an earlier pledge to call early elections if his
majority fell to 150, Mitsotakis met with President Karamanlis. Parliament was
dissolved and elections were scheduled six months early (Facts on File Sept.16, 1993:
695-696).

The Return of Papandreou
The split and fall of the Mitsotakis government and the New Democracy Party
gave Andreas Papandreou one last chance to return to power. Elections were scheduled
for October 10, 1993 and resulted in Papandreou's PASOK gaining 46.88 percent of vote,
but 170 seats in the Vouli, a substantial majority in the 300-seat parliament. New
Democracy, now led by Miltiades Evert, garnered only 39.30 percent of the vote and 109
seats. Andonis Samaras' defecting Political Spring gained only 4.87 percent of the vote
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and 11 seats. The remainder was carried by the Communist/Socialist alliance and one
independent (Apostolou 1995, 380-381).
Papandreou's election was not greeted with any enthusiasm outside of Greece.
Papandreou's immediate halt of the previous government's privatization program upset
the EC and just the fact that Papandreou was re-elected was enough to worry the United
States. Many expected a return to his former rhetoric of anti-imperialism and antiAmericanism, and a return to a left-wing nationalist view of the world. However, when
Greece assumed the Presidency of the EC in January 1994 Greece promised that it would
continue to honor the terms of the Maastricht Treaty and to continue to reform the
economy. Relations with the US were stable. The only problem was with Macedonia.
Papandreou promised not to recognize the state under any title bearing 'Macedonia' in it
('Can you ... ' 1993, 19-20). Papandreou also slapped unilateral sanctions on the small
country which had thought that it was past that with the previous government.
Papandreou was also able to get a new President elected when the aging, but still
respected, Constantinos Karamanlis' term was up in the Spring of 1995. PASOK had
enough of a majority to have its own candidate, Constantinos Stephanopoulos, elected
President in March 1995 and solidify its position for the next four years. To guarantee
Stephanopoulos' election PASOK made an alliance with Samaras' Political Spring Party
to gain the necessary 180 parliamentary votes ('End of term .. .' 1995, 60).
Papandreou, meanwhile, was continuing Greek foreign policy that was much
different from his previous years in office. For example, Greece agreed to a Turkish-EU
Customs Union finally in return for agreements from the EU on making Cyprus a full
member. Relations with Albania were civilized ('End of term .. .' 1995, 60).
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Greece recognized Macedonia, ended the trade blockade on the country, and endorsed
her membership in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and other
international organizations ('In the name ... ' 1995, 64).
Papandreou's health was failing him. In Greece's personality-dominated political
system this brought the country to a standstill. Papandreou had open-heart surgery in
1988 and was urged by his doctors to have another. He was able to work only half days
and was put in the hospital at the end of November 1995 (Stathos 1996,1).
For five weeks he was reported near death suffering from pneumonia, a
pulmonary infection and respiratory problems (Anastasi 1995, 13). Greek politics,
internal and external, were brought to a halt as Papandreou teetered on the brink of death.
Others in PASOK were scrambling for position in an effort to promote themselves as
potential successors. There was bipartisan pressure for Papandreou to resign from his
office. Rumors abounded that Papandreou's young wife, nicknamed 'Mimi,' was
preventing him from doing so. Supposedly she was trying to solidify her position in the
Party upon her husband's death. However, as director of the Prime Minister's Office she
had more power than many would have liked (Papadopoulos 1996, 3 ).
Despite continued worsening health problems Papandreou would not resign his
post. Meanwhile, the country had come to such a standstill that almost nothing replaced
news reports from the Onassis Cardiosurgical Center, where Papandreou was in intensive
care. It was not until January 1996 that Papandreou finally resigned from the
Premiership. Papandreou's replacement was a complete surprise in many quarters. The
dominance of the succession process in Greek news was such that the new Prime
Minister was faced with his first major crisis immediately upon taking office.
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Enter Simitis
When Andreas Papandreou finally announced his resignation from his post in
early January 1996, the PASOK party immediately called for an internal vote to occupy
the position. The result was Costas Simitis, a founder of the PASOK Party in 1974 and
an expert on commercial law. Compared to Papandreou, Simitis is boring. He is mildmannered, efficient, and much more centrist in the PASOK Party. He quickly dismissed
many Papandreou loyalists, but left Papandreou's son George in his position as Minister
of Education. He also promised to continue the privatization program, yet left
Papandreou's economic team intact, to the surprise of many in the European Union.
Simitis is very pro-European and as such is expected to make many moves toward
aligning the Greek economy more with EU guidelines. Simitis also hoped to strengthen
ties with the US, Turkey and Macedonia, three states that were normally opposed to
Socialist dominance of Greek politics ('Looking... ' 1996: 44-45).
National security was also a top priority for Mr. Simitis. Relations with NATO
and the US were expected to be strengthened under his leadership as were relations with
Greece's perennial enemy, Turkey. Relations among the four had proceeded normally for
most of the time that Papandreou was in office. Greece had contributed 1000 troops to
the NATO operation in Bosnia as well as the anti-sanction operations in the Adriatic. In
return, Greece continued to receive increases in aid from the US, around $315 .2 million
in 1995, and arms transfers under the Cascade Program from other NATO states that
were downsizing. This is noteworthy in that while most other NATO states felt they
could reduce their armed forces without any potential decrease in security, Greece
continued to maintain her defense spending at around 5.5 percent of GDP, the highest of
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any EU or NATO member (Dokos 1995, 412). Defense priorities for Greece were still
directed east. The end of January 1996 provides us with yet another example of GreekTurkish problems. To many the crisis was over a small rock in the Aegean that should
have been left to the goats. To Greece and Turkey it is a question of sovereignty that
has the potential to drag the rest of Europe into a conflict it neither wants nor can afford
It is a continuing problem that could tear asunder NATO's Southern Flank at a time when
the eastern Mediterranean is becoming more important to NATO/US operations.

The Im.ia Crisis - January 28-31, 1996
The Imia crisis, or K.ard.ak Crisis as it is known in Turkey, in the greater scheme
of Greco-Turkish relations, was but another example of the hostility and underlying
tension that pervades the relationship between the two. Unfortunately, the end result was
dominated by the intervention of the United States and the indomitable Richard
Holbrooke.
The origins of the Imia crisis began on December 26, 1995 when the Turkish
flagged merchant vessel 'Fiket Arket' was found moored off the island by local Greeks
from the nearby island ofKalymnos. Dialogue revealed that the Turkish transport had
moored off the islet for minor repairs. The Greek delegation, satisfied with the answer,
returned home. Little was heard of the incident at the time due to Andreas Papandreou's
ailing health dominating the news ('To kroniko ... ' 1996, 13 ).
Two days later, the small vessel was still there and it was determined that the boat
would have to be towed to port. With the help of two local Greek tugboats, the 'Fiket
Arket' was towed across the small channel to the Turkish harbor of Boulouk. At that
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time in Athens, it was announced that the PASOK government would have a vote on
January 20, 1996 to find a replacement for the ailing Papandreou. Locals on the island of
Kalymnos were worried about the action of the Turkish vessel, and, in a fit of paranoia,
sent a small delegation of children led by a local priest to place a Greek flag on the
island that was otherwise used to graze some goats ('To kroniko .. .' 1996, 13).
On December 25, 1995 Turkish reporters from the newspaper 'Houriet' went
to the island of Imia/Kardak and replaced the Greek flag on the island with a Turkish flag
amid great publicity on local Turkish television. Sunday, January 28, 1996, Greek news
reported that the Greek Ministry of Defense had heard of the action. The Greek MND
ordered Naval ships to replace the Turkish flag with a Greek one in response
('To kroniko .. .' 1996, 13).
Gerasimos Arsenis, Minister of National Defense, announced on the evening of
January 28 that the Greek Armed Forces were ready to defend the country if events
warranted. The Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theodore Pangalos, called the
Turkish Ambassador to lodge a formal complaint against his government. He then
informed the ambassadors of the United States and Russia of the Greek response
(Etheiseis Elliniki T eleorasi 31 Jan.1996 ).
By Monday morning, January 29, Greek and Turkish Air and Naval Forces were
converging in large numbers around the small island. In the Vouli, Prime Minister
Simitis declared Greek sovereignty over the island and that no one would touch 'a
handful of Greek land.' Monday afternoon Gerasimos Arsenis and Theodore Pangalos
supported the Prime Minister's statement with the action that was being taken by the
Greek military (Etheiseis Elliniki Teleorasi 31 Jan.1996).
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Within the hour, Ankara warned Greek military units to withdraw from the island
and continued to operate military units in the area. The Turkish Foreign Minister stated
that the 1932 treaty between Italy and Turkey and the 1947 Italian Treaty, which returned
the Dodecanese islands to Greece, were not valid and also asked that Greek military units
withdraw from the island. The Turkish Foreign Ministry also announced that it would
begin challenging the treaties in legal arenas (Etheiseis Elliniki Teleorasi 31 Jan.1996).
The morning of January 30th, Turkish troops appeared near the islet. Tansu
Ciller, the Turkish Prime Minister, stated that the Greek flag should be removed and the
the Greek Navy withdraw from the area surrounding the island The Greek Prime
Minister responded before the Parliament: "The Government has taken measures
diplomatically and strategically to defuse the crisis and guarantee the territorial
sovereignty of our borders. The armed forces remain in the area to balance Turkish
forces in the area and to remain ifthe Tukish forces remain (Etheiseis Elliniki Teleorasi
31 Jan.1996)."
Tragedy struck, however, when a Greek Navy helicopter conducting a
surveillance of Turkish forces in the area crashed into the Aegean with three personnel
on board. All three military personnel perished in the incident. The accident seemed to
have warned off both sides as cooler heads then prevailed ('To kroniko ... ' 1996, 13).
Like the incident in 1987, the United States was forced to get involved to aid in
defusing the crisis. US President Bill Clinton called Simitis and Ciller and urged both to
refrain from the use of force and to reach an agreement through dialogue. However, the
night of January 30 saw Greek and Turkish forces within extremely close range of one
another (Etheiseis Elliniki Teleorasi 31 Jan.1996).
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Wednesday, January 31st, the US State Department, represented by Richard
Holbrooke, announced that the crisis in the Aegean would defuse within the next 48
hours. Holbrooke was initially to help begin talks between Greece and Turkey over the
Cyprus problem. The Imia incident forced Holbrooke to change the focus to the Aegean.
US remarks and neutrality on the issue gave Simitis a political dilemma that fueled
public sentiment against the US. The US publicly stated that it did not recognize either
state's sovereignty over the 10-acre island US Ambassador to Greece Thomas Niles
stated, "The State Department has taken no posititon on the issue and as I say, the
position of the United States is irrelevant. We have no standing. We are not signatories,
we are not the people, the country, the instance that decides ('US remarks ... ' 1996: 3).
The lack of a US position on the issue incensed the Greek government. Such a position
was tantamount to supporting the Turkish position.
Meanwhile, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana waited to see what
continued American action would look like before involving NATO officially in the
crisis. In the end NATO took no role in the crisis. Support for Greece came from an
unusual area, when Russia came out in full support of the Greek position and firmly
against the Turkish actions. Reports speculate this was in return for unwavering Greek
support for Russian operations in Chechnya which the Greeks insisted was a strictly
internal Rusian matter @theiseis Elliniki Teleorasi 31 Jan.1996).
Firm support also came down from the European Union. In a strongly worded
resolution, the European Parliament stressed that Greek borders were EU borders,
expressed concern over Turkey's provocative military moves and accused it of trying to
destabilize the Aegean. The resolution declared that Turkey was violating its agreements
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with the EU and declared that lmia was a part of Greece. In response, the Turkish
Foreign Minister Deniz Baykal began an immediate tour of European Union capitals in
an effort to lobby for neutrality ('Simitis gets... ' 1996, 1).
Finally the two sides stopped sparring with one another. The crisis was defused
and Greece and Turkey returned to disagreeing.

Summary
The post-Cold war era has not been easy for any country to get used to. However,
for Greece, the years since 1989 have not been so much about redressing the balance of
power in Europe, but reforming Greek foreign policy in the years after Andreas
Papandreou's years in office. They have been dominated by rapproachement with the
Europeans and the Americans. Greece has restored its relationship with NATO insofar as
it does not interfere with Greek security concerning the Aegean and Thrace.
The short-lived government of Constantinos Mitsotakis was able to begin briefly
bringing Greek foreign policy back into the mainstream but popular nationalism soon
took hold of the foreign policy arena. The question of Macedonia was an emotional one
for the Greek people that the government could not avoid. Later, when Andonis Samaras
left the New Democracy Party over the issue, it can be said that the Macedonian question
caused the collapse of the Mitsotakis government. It is but one example of how popular
nationalism and intra-governmental politics in Greece play a major role in Greek foreign
policy. Elections later brought about the return of Papandreou when Mitsotakis' majority
collapsed due to further defections over the Macedonian issue.
Despite fears from many sides, the return of Andreas Papandreou to the helm of
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the Greek political machine was not as detrimental as was initially anticipated. In reality
there was not much Papandreou could do. Gone were the days of playing close relations
with the Eastern bloc against his allies in the West. Instead, Greece improved relations
with the European Union as a counter-balance to the influence of the US and NATO.
However, US-Greek relations remained fairly stable.
The centerpiece of Greek foreign policy still revolves around the perceived
Turkish threat. The relationship is becoming more antagonistic over other areas in the
Aegean besides Cyprus. This is perhaps more dangerous. In effect, now Greece and
Turkey have more opportunities to disagree, and more opportunities for full-fledged
conflict. Added to that is the fact that neither has decreased its defense spending. Such a
combination has increased the threat in the post-Cold War eastern Mediterranean.
The effect on the relationship between Greece and her allies is still ambiguous.
With firm support from the European Union, Greece is less reliant on NATO, so it
appears that Greek policy in balancing the two organizations is paying off However, it
has yet to gain any firm US and NATO support for its positions vis-a-vis Turkey. If such
a track continues it could see an even greater distance develop between Greece and the
US. The only relationship between the two that remains is US and NATO arms transfers
to modernize the Greek military. Unfortunately, the new weapons are being used to
upgrade the Greek position in relation to Turkey instead of improving Greece's potential
to help combat a threat to the alliance.
Without the common threat that dominated NATO ideology for over 40 years,
domestic and regional conflicts that are between one or a few members of the alliance
will begin dominating member nation foreign policies. NATO defense policy in the post-
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Cold War era is some vague notion of defending its European members from an outside
threat. Yet it still does not take a stance on the Greek-Turkish problem. Brussels still
will not guarantee the defense of Greece from a potential Turkish threat, only from an
outside one. NATO influence over the Greeks has decreased dramatically in return.
The unilateral withdrawal of American bases in Greece has also ended the
massive dominance of that country in Greece as well. Since the 1974 Turkish invasion of
Cyprus the 'core' power of the Atlantic Alliance, Washington, has slowly lost its
commandeering position over the various Greek administrations. The final base
closures are a testament to that.
The issues that have dominated Greek domestic and international relations for so
long provide excellent examples of a new trend in theories of alliance cohesion as well as
the effect domestic politics and regional priorities have on intra-alliance dynamics in
general. Existing theories were developed at the height of the Cold War to explain how
NATO had formed and remained in existence. While these theories are still useful in
examining how and why states form multilateral defensive partnerships, the theories are
not entirely applicable to the Greek example and have only been applied generally.
The application of the Greek case to these theories presents many variables not
previously entertained in alliance theory. These theories need to be altered to account for
regional priorities and the effect domestic political dynamics have on individual alliance
members in the context of the entire alliance as well as, when applicable, the dominating
'core' power of such an alliance. As the Greek case has demonstrated, domestic politics
can develop resentment aimed at the alliance or 'core' due to a lack of action by these
forces when it concerns individual members of the alliance. Alliance cohesion can suffer
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as individual members concentrate on regional priorities as opposed to alliance priorities.
In the Greek case, US/NATO priorities have become secondary considerations as
she concentrates on a regional threat from the east. As this threat is also a NATO
member, it must be admitted that NATO cohesion is nonexistent in the Southern Flank.
Before 1974 the US may have been able to guarantee the commitment of Greek and
Turkish forces to their alliance roles. However, lack of US action against the Turkish
invasion of Cyprus and frequent violations of Greek territorial waters and airspace has
severely lessened Washington's influence in Athens.
Alliance theory does not account for such multilateral problems among alliance
members. Both the Greeks and the Turks perceive the US as favoring the other. In
addition, both sides see US neutrality over the continued Greco-Turkish issues as an
affront and a firm example of US support for the other.
In conclusion, present theories of alliance cohesion simply lack any application
of the effect domestic politics, intra-alliance dynamics and the development of threats
between alliance members have on alliance cohesion. Existing theories must be revised
to include these important factors effecting alliance cohesion.

98

CHAPTER6

CONCLUSIONS

The relationship between the Greek government and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization has not been a stable one. The independence of Greece in the early 19th
century brought about the Kingdom of Greece and at the same time institutionalized
Greek reliance on outside power for its protection. Initially Greece relied on Great
Britain, the power of the Mediterranean. The end of World War Il and the severity of the
Civil War that was to come brought in the United States. The US role in Greek security
became the most prevalent.
Because of Greece's reliance on outside power for protection she was forced into
a security stance that promoted and protected US policy in its anti-Communist defense.
When Greece did accede to NATO in 1951 she was prepared to provide the United States
with an outpost against Communism in the eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans.
However, the objectives of the Alliance and the United States were able to dominate
Greek policy to such an extent that, when the coup of 1967 took place, neither was really
interested in guaranteeing democratic values as long as Greece continued its NATO
commitments.
However, NATO and the US also failed to recognize changing patterns in Greek
security and rhetoric. By 1955 Turkey and Greece had begun sparring over issues that by
1974 nearly led to war between the two over the issue of Cyprus. Neither NATO nor the
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US was prepared for such an eventuality of war between two member states and adopted
a posture of Alliance policy first and Greek and Turkish problems second. Mainly this
was an effort to provide the two countries with a common ground and basis for mutual
security. Unfortunately, by 1974 it was too late. Greece altered its entire security
strategy, moving from a northern defensive doctrine to an eastern threat By the 1980's
Greece was almost totally independent of NATO strategy, especially since the latter
policy favored the Turks. The threats Greece and NATO were arrayed against were
simply not the same.
Even as recently as January 1996 Greece and Turkey nearly came to blows over
the rocky islet oflmia in the eastern Aegean. The post-Cold War era had not changed
defense policy for Greece. NATO was looking to reform itself in the new era, but Greece
is still forced to concentrate on the potential Turkish threat until such time as the two can
come to terms of peaceful co-existence.

Review of the Theoretical Literature
The literature that has evolved around the development of alliances and alliance
cohesion all maintain one common theme: that alliances, both international and
domestic, are formed to enable their members to achieve a shared objective. Collective
security communities generally disband after the objectives for which they were created
have been achieved. Alternately, it is a political community that maintains its cohesion
over more varied collaborative efforts.
The response of the alliance to conflict is an integral part of this discussion. The
alliance must at times be forced to deal with crises that are out of its scope or mandate.

100

Certain members may disagree over the mandate of the organization to deal with a
potential or current crisis. However, unlike the potential external conflict that the
alliance is formed to deal with, and that existing theories are based on, the discussion
here is concerned with the development of intra-alliance conflict and its effect on the
stability and goals of the collective, especially in light of the Greek experience.
One of the main architects of alliance theory is George F. Liska. His main
theories postulate that alliances are formed against and for someone or something. Each
member considers the utility that can be gained from alliance membership, or, as in the
case of NATO, a dominant alliance member may pressure or suggest to others that
joining may be of benefit to both. The positive utility of joining then must normally
outweigh the stress of unilateral action. This also provides the basis of alliance
cohesiveness, integral to the relationship between Greece and NATO. This cohesiveness,
Liska maintains, is based on the balance of internal and external pressures against the
ratio of gains to liabilities for individual allies (1962, 175).
Nations join alliances for security, stability, and status. Liska notes that another
primary reason for alliance cohesion is the development of an alliance ideology (Liska
1962, 61 ). This provides the rationalization of an alliance. The NATO rationalization
for years was the threat of the Warsaw Pact. Now it is searching for a new
rationalization. However, it is presently being bombarded with differing views.
Enlargement to the east is to guarantee the security of those states from a resurgent
Russia. The US, Great Britain, Germany and France are also seeking to maintain the
alliance but for differing but well known reasons. The alliance condition is based on a
perceived, unifying threat. When members of the alliance lessen the necessity of the
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formation or have a quite different view of the utility of the alliance it creates greater
stress for those members that still rely on NATO for defensive guarantees (Bladen 1970,
124).
According to Liska, "A dogmatic interest in alliance is qualitatively different from
the particular interests which an alliance is to serve." Essentially the differences are
further exacerbated when only some allies develop or lose interest in alliance leaving
others to maintain the structure (Liska 1962, 139).
One of the few qualitative explanations of the effect of particularities in alliance
membership interest is from Christopher Bladen. In summary he states:

In the case of NATO it seems likely that intra-group cleavages
cannot always be patched over. Failure of the Multilateral Force proposal
and France's effective withdrawal from membership are but two indications
of this and may be symbolic precursors of a gradual but general dissolution.
If this should turn out to be the case it will prove once again that allies'
diversity of interests limits alliance to defense against a fairly specific
common external threat. On the whole the ad hoc nature of the coalition
has frustrated attempts to use NATO for other than the military tasks for
which it was created (1970, 125).

While the above is unable to include the current NATO IFOR operation in the
former Yugoslavia due to its date, Bladen's statement is significant in his contribution to
Cold War alliance theory. It provides us with a succinct statement that intra-alliance
politics can take over and become more important for some states than overall alliance
policy of the time. The diversity of interests argument, however, is still lacking in
application to the Greek study. Greek security policy was not just diversified in the sense
that it had other threats in addition to the potential Soviet/Communist. By 1974 Greece
had ceased to see the north as a primary threat at all and viewed NATO as a co-
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conspirator in the 1967 Colonel's Coup and the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus.
Cold War theories on small state foreign policies and relationships with the superpowers are more adequate in explaining the Greek case. As a member of the Western
Alliance, Greece was interested in the survival of its member bloc and its self-interest
within the bi-polar system that existed at the time. Postulated by Robert L. Rothstein, for
the small state membership in an alliance can constitute a major psychological increase
or decrease in status and prestige as well as concurrent perceptions and actual amounts of
independence (1970, 354).
Small states that have entered into alliances dominated by one of the superpowers, Rothstein goes on to state, end up doing so reluctantly and only under perception
of a major threat. The theoretical distinctions between a great-power/small-power
relationship and a mixed multilateral alliance is still valid, but in practice the distinction

has been diluted It is the superior or dominant power that insists on the form of the
relationship, normally espousing multilateral relationships in an effort to decrease the
political losses alignment generally brings about. The small powers, on the other hand,
may generally prefer a bilateral agreement. The bilateral form guarantees more aid,
financial and material, to the smaller state. Of course, the multilateral alliance can also
provide the smaller state more intra-alliance leverage and the chance to espouse its own
views. Form, Rothstein says, is based on perceptions concerning the degree of danger. If
high, a bilateral relationship is wiser and faster (1970, 354-355).

In general the theoretical aspects reviewed here cannot be evaluated within the
context of Greek-NATO security relations without reviewing the historical
developments between the two. The context can then be related based on the specifics of
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Greek security policy and its relationship with the NATO and the United States.

Re-examining the Historical Developments
In attempting to apply the historical background of Greek-NATO relations to the

theoretical developments of alliance cohesion, it is necessary to begin with the early
Greek kingdom's relationship with the Great Powers. As Greek independence developed,
its security was guaranteed by the powers provided it did not make claims on Ottoman
territories. Initially the British dominated an essentially bilateral relationship. This
relationship continued to the end of World War II.
Various personalities have also emerged throughout Greek history to bring about
a period of independence to Greek foreign policy. The first was Eleftherios Venizelos,
the Prime Minister who led Greece into the Balkan Pact and World War I. He helped
Greece retain much of its traditional lands and solidified Greek relations with the British
as opposed to the monarchy's desire to side with Imperial Germany.
The inter-war period saw Greece attempting to maintain some semblance of
independence of foreign policy. Unfortunately for Greece, Venizelos, long respected
throughout Europe, was no longer in Greek politics. Instead Greece had become
embroiled in yet another power struggle between the Prime Minister, the King, and the
military. General Ioannis Metaxas had taken full dictatorial powers of Greece in the face
of a collapsing domestic political system. He led Greece through the entrance of World
War II and the defeat ofltaly pushing the fascist forces of Mussolini back into Albania.
The preceding years had also seen the rise of a very organized and well equipped
Communist Party within Greece. During the German occupation from 1941 to 1944 the
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Communists fought valiantly against the Germans side by side with the Royalists and
Republicans. However, at the same time they took the pains to gain overall power in
Greece when the occupation ended. If not for the immediate occupation by British
forces, and the unrelenting support Britain had for the Greek Monarchy, the Communist
Party would have had a victory in Greece.
The British were not able to maintain their support for Greece, however. Like the
rest of Europe the British had to rebuild a war-shattered economy and still deal with the
remains of its colonial empire. The Greek problem was then taken over by the United
States. The Americans declared an all-out campaign against the rising forces of
Communism throughout eastern Europe. The Truman Doctrine, providing aid to Greece
and Turkey to prevent their falling under Communist control, eventually helped the
Greek monarchy defeat the Communist forces.
The Truman Doctrine not only provided aid to the Greeks but brought the US
pervasively into all aspects of Greek politics and the military. Greece acceded to NATO,
along with Turkey, in 1951 at the encouragement of the Americans. The possible
resurgence of the Communists, the start of the Korean War, and the Communist coup in
Czechoslovakia provided the impetus for Greece and being backed up by the US gave
Greece a large amount of prestige in the region. Unfortunately for the Greeks and
Americans, their relationship almost immediately began a downward spiral.
While NATO and the US concentrated on the Central European theater of NATO,
where any expected Soviet attack into Europe was expected to come from, Greece was
left to provide support to the US throughout the 1950's and 1960's. This was especially
important as the US increased aid to Israel. The Middle East wars made US bases in
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Greece extremely important, as well as providing important strategic listening posts for
US intelligence into the southern flank of the Warsaw Pact. This further enhanced the
idea that Greece was more a bilateral partner of the US rather than a full fledged member
of NATO.
Relations between Greece and Turkey also began to take precedence over the
Greek relationship with NATO or any other multilateral collective defense. Various
crises between the two and the ethnic problems on the island of Cyprus endangered
relations between the two throughout the 1960's.
In 1967 the Greek military led a coup that brought about eight years of military

rule to Greece. During this period the populace began to change many ideas of Greece's
relations with the so-called powers. The US and NATO made no effort, as perceived by
the Greeks, to oppose the dictatorship. As long as Greece carried out her commitments
to the Alliance, the internal situation in Greece mattered little to the Western powers
The military government in Greece, overthrown in 1974 by yet another General,
faced with growing internal opposition attempted to stage a coup on the island of Cyprus
in an attempt to unite the island with Greece. This led to a Turkish invasion of the
northern third of the island that no amount of foreign influence could prevent. It also
forever changed the security relationship between Greece and the Western Alliance.
The return of a democratically elected government to Greece brought about major
changes in Greek foreign policy vis-a-vis NATO. The Greeks felt that the Alliance
should have taken a more active role in the Cyprus invasion rather than allow the de facto
Turkish occupation of the island. Then Prime Minister Constantinos Karamanlis
withdrew Greece from the military wing of NATO in response, an action parallel to the
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stance of De Gaulle in the 1960's. Karamanlis also brought Greece into the European
Economic Community. In addition to the economic benefits from such association,
Karamanlis also hoped to enter Greece into a more independent policy from that
provided with the US and NATO alliance. Greece also proceeded to reform its military
and security policy. The government maintained that the most urgent threat was the one
from the east as opposed to the NATO policy of protecting the European allies from a
potential Soviet invasion into central Europe.
A more radical change was yet to come with the arrival of the Socialist Andreas
Papandreou to the premiership. While not forthcoming in his threats to withdraw Greece
from the EEC, NATO, and to cancel the bases agreement with the US, Papandreou's
radical ideology and relations with various pariah states was a major concern to the West.
Papandreou became yet another example of a populist leader that dominated the Greek
political scene.
While he failed to follow through on his campaign rhetoric Papandreou did
initiate a fairly independent foreign policy. Unfortunately, his policies alienated him
politically from the West except for other Socialist leaders. He cultivated relations with
many states politically and socially unacceptable to the majority of the world. He
maintained close relations with Libya, the dictatorship of Panama, the Palestinian
Liberation Organization, and other terrorist states. He also continued an increasing
rapprochement with the Eastern Bloc, including the Soviet Union. It was his goal to limit
the traditional dominance of the US and NATO as much as possible.
However, Papandreou is universally considered to have gone too far in his
policies. He refused to condemn the USSR for the 1982 downing of the Korean Air

107

Lines 747 over Sakhalin Island maintaining that it was a US spy plane and stating that he
would have done the same. He publicly supported the military regime of Poland under
General Jarulzelski and continued to argue that the US was a purely imperialistic
capitalist enemy of the world.
The 1990's have seen little change in Greek foreign policy. It has attempted to
balance the influence of NATO and the US with membership in the EU. Relations with
Turkey have remained constant. Unfortunately they have generally alternated between
cool and a near-war footing. The recent crisis over the islet oflmia, in the eastern
Aegean, has maintained for Greece that its security policy should still be focused by the
Turkish threat. The failure of the US and NATO to condemn the Turks over that
incident, and other actions, has further confirmed to the Greeks that it is correct in its
policy.

The Changing Nature of Greek-NATO Relations in the oost-Cold War era
The post-Cold War era has seen NATO searching for a new mandate. The
member states have continued in alliance and have begun considering enlargement to the
east. Greece has also sought to maintain its links with the alliance. It is participating in
the NATO IFOR operation in the former Yugoslavia and is benefiting from the continued
membership in any way that it can. It continues to receive military material from other
states downsizing their armed forces. Greece on the other hand has maintained the
strength of its military in constant anxiety of the Turkish threat.
Unlike the Cold War, during which NATO policy dominated the overall alliance
structure, Greece included, the current era does not have a common NATO policy. After
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1974 Greece had already begun a separation from collective NATO policy. Instead, the
Greeks initiated a defensive policy from a perceived Turkish threat. This diversion of
policy between member and alliance created a significantly different situation for the
alliance as a whole. For the first time, one member state found another member state to
be a greater security threat than the common threat.
In reality, Greece had always had a closer relationship with US security policy in
the region than collective security in central Europe. American bases in Greece were
essential for the maintenance of a US presence in the Mediterranean and in support of
Israel. This relationship was far more important than any potential threat from Albania,
Yugoslavia, or Bulgaria. While it may be considered that US/NATO policy leans
towards a slight favor of Turkey in strategic terms, the constant tension between the
Greeks and Turks is hardly favorable to anyone.

If a common security policy develops in the future it will not matter in the least to
Greece if the Turkish threat is still existent. The closing of US bases in Greece has
lessened her importance for US operations in the Mediterranean. However, until the
stability of the Middle East is ensured, or the situation in Yugoslavia is terminated,
Greece has the potential to be an important player in the region. Thus far its role has
been limited to reaction to the independence of the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia.
Greek policy over the issue of Macedonia's name was misunderstood by most of
the Western allies. The policy was dominated by knee-jerk nationalists in the
government and the population. Its role in the downfall of the Mitsotakis government
initiated concern among the Western governments that finally gave support to the Greek
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position. Unfortunately it was too late to save his government.
Relations with the European Union have allowed Greece to pursue a foreign
policy independent of the US and Turkey for the first time since the end of World War II.
It has also given Greece much more status and power as opposed to her membership in

NATO. In addition it has relatively balanced the priority in policy NATO has given
Turkey.
It falls to perception. NATO members, Greece included, must still see a positive

sum gain of remaining in NATO and the organization continuing in an evolving role.
Greece itself gains by the open information policy NATO requires of all members. In
reality it is gaining excellent intelligence on the Turkish military. Greece is also able to
veto moves by the Alliance that would favor Turkey or moves by Turkey that would
allow it to influence the alliance, another major benefit of remaining within NATO. The
Alliance continues to provide Greece with a forum to voice its concerns to the major
European players that are also, in most cases, members of the European Union. In
addition, and as in Europe as a whole, Greece's continued involvement has guaranteed
US involvement and a say in European and Greek security. The most recent incident in
the Aegean attests to that. Lastly, NATO is of prime importance to the financially
strapped Greek military. The Cascade and PHARE programs provide Greece with nextgeneration military equipment at virtually no cost and help it to maintain parity with the
Turkish armed forces.

Conclusions

The theories presented earlier in the chapter have shown that an alliance, as any
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other community, remains together through the perception of its member states receiving
some gain from continued membership. Greece has sought to maintain her ties with
NATO. It is assumed that she perceives membership more advantageous than nonmembership. Collectively this is the same for the other states as well. NATO is still in
existence because its member states find it beneficial to reform the Alliance rather than
begin again or end their collective relationship. The theories fail in one aspect, though.
They are outdated. Now the alliance lacks a shared mission unless we look at reform of
the Alliance as that objective.
Based on existing formal theory NATO should have disbanded yet it is still in
existence and looking to gain new members as well. Greece has remained a member
despite unilateral withdrawals from NATO's military command a number of times over
the previous 4 decades. Indeed it is evident that Greece has developed a significantly
different security threat from that of the Alliance as a whole since at least 1974. To
explain this requires a new theory on small state security within a collective security
organization.
There is no contemporary theory yet available to explain the relationship between
Greece and NATO. The theories currently existing, all developed in the middle of the
Cold War, suggest that no matter what internal problems or intra-alliance rivalries arise
among member states, the formal policy of the alliance takes over-riding importance,
especially ifthe alliance is to survive. In the case of Greek-NATO relations, though,
what exists, and what has existed since 1974, is a member state whose continued
membership is based not on a shared alliance objective, but on the other benefits
obtained from the collective security organization. These benefits are then channeled
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into a separate Greek defense policy directed against Turkey. another NATO member.
While formal theory accepts that there will and do exist internecine problems. it
is lacking in the consideration of the diverging policies of smaller member states like
Greece. The post-Cold War era has thrown alliance theory for a curve. NATO exists,
but is lacking in a shared threat or purpose. other than to continue its existence.
Greece is still a member. but its security policy is much different than will be developed
by the alliance as a whole. IfNATO begins a transformation into a security community it
will become much more :flexible in dealing with rising security threats against its
European members. Whether it will be able to deal with conflicting members like
Greece and Turkey, however, will remain to be seen.
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